Bind 3 i doktordisputats. Bind 1 i 2005. Titel: Renewable energy governance systems:A comparison of the "political price-/amount market" model with the "political quota-/certificate price market" system. by Hvelplund, Frede
 
  
 
Aalborg Universitet
Bind 3 i doktordisputats. Bind 1 i 2005. Titel: Renewable energy governance systems
A comparison of the "political price-/amount market" model with the "political quota-/certificate
price market" system.
Hvelplund, Frede
Publication date:
2001
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Hvelplund, F. (2001). Bind 3 i doktordisputats. Bind 1 i 2005. Titel: Renewable energy governance systems: A
comparison of the "political price-/amount market" model with the "political quota-/certificate price market"
system.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: November 25, 2020
Renewable Energy Governance Systems
A comparison of the “political price-/amount market” model with
the “political quota-/certificate price market" system
(The German and Danish cases)
Frede Hvelplund
Aalborg University July 2001
Copyright: Frede Hvelplund
Printing: Centertrykkeriet, Aalborg Universitet.
Distribution: Department of Development and Planning, Aalborg Univer-
sity , Fibigerstræde 11, 9220 Aalborg O
ISBN No.: 87-90893-26-3
Published by: Institute for development and Planning, Aalborg University,
July 2001
Contents
Preface ........................................................................................................5
1. Introduction: Public regulation and renewable energy (RE ) - political
prices or political quotas ? ...........................................................................7
2. Methodological and theoretical approach...............................................11
2.1. The main methodological structure.................................................11
2.2. The analytical macro-structure: Important areas and .....................14
mechanisms of governance ....................................................................14
3. The two models .....................................................................................17
4. Illusions in the "Political price-/amount market" versus the "Political
quota-/certificate price market" model discourse........................................21
5 The EU state of affairs............................................................................27
5.1 2000-2001 changes furthering an open-ended discussion of the future
RE regulation framework ......................................................................27
5.2 The EU goals with regard to RE based electricity production ..........29
6. Renewable energy: the case of public regulation in a situation with
differences in the natural resource base......................................................35
6.1 The wind resource situation (a case example) ..................................36
6.2 The "Political quota-/certificate price market" model ......................37
6.3 The advanced "Political price-/amount market" model: politically set
prices and market determined RE amounts. ...........................................41
6.3.1 The characteristics of the advanced "Political price-/amount
market" model...................................................................................41
6.3.2 The cost and price efficiency of the advanced "Political price-
/amount market" model .....................................................................43
6.3.3 Comparison of the advanced "Political price-/amount market"
model with the "Political quota-/certificate price market" model........46
7. An institutional analysis of RE governance models. ...............................49
7.1 The Danish “Political quota-/certificate price market”: a double price
market system combined with a politically fixed quota...........................51
7.2. The institutional analysis................................................................52
7.3 Comparison of the “Political price-/amount market” with the
“Political quota-/certificate market”model ...........................................56
7.3.1 “Liberalizing” a dwindling market and “bureaucratising” a
growing market .................................................................................56
7.3.2 The "Political quota-/certificate price market" system and the
socio-economic costs of renewable energy ........................................60
7.3.3 Abolishing price stability and the decreased local and neighbour
participation......................................................................................61
2
8 Renewable energy and system integration...............................................67
9. The Danish discussion and decision process behind the introduction of a
"Political quota-/certificate price market" system.......................................71
9.1 Purpose and theoretical approach...................................................71
9.2.  Symptom analysis with regard to the decision process ...................75
9.2.1. The discussion before the parliamentary agreement on March 3rd,
1999 .................................................................................................75
9.2.2 The implementation analysis and discussions from August 1999
to December 1999.............................................................................82
9.2.3 Conclusion regarding the symptoms of the discourse and decision
process..............................................................................................85
9.3 Symptoms of groupthink ..................................................................90
9.4 Antecedent conditions influencing the decision making process .......92
9.5 What made the decision process defective?......................................94
9.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................97
10. Conclusion/executive summary.......................................................... 101
10.1 Comparison of two RE-electricity governance frameworks (“first
order” institutions) .............................................................................102
10.2 The discourse behind the design of the Danish RE- electricity reform.
(“second order institutions”) ..............................................................115
11. A coming innovative and democratic "Political price-/amount market"
system. .................................................................................................... 119
12. Postscript in view of a European market for RE ................................. 121
References............................................................................................... 123
5
Preface
This book is one of three books from the research project, "Internationalisa-
tion of the Energy Markets, and its Influence Upon the Danish Energy Pol-
icy-with Special Focus Upon the Danish-German connection".
The project was financed by the Ministry of Environment and Energy within
the program for Energy and Society, and Aalborg University. In this book,
"Renewable Energy Governance Systems", the new German renewable en-
ergy law is compared with the Danish renewable energy legislation from
1999.
In another book "Electricity Reforms, Innovative Democracy and Techno-
logical Change", I analyse the dynamics of the Danish energy system and its
public regulation processes, with special focus on the electricity sector.
A third book "Current corporate strategies of the German Electricity Supply
Industry" written by Lutz Mez and Annette Piening, Freie Universität, Ber-
lin, deals with the development within the German energy sectors, focussing
on public regulation processes, and the electricity sector.
Without intending to escape a personal responsibility for the written English,
I want to thank both Gwen Bingle and Juliana Felkner for their competent
and patient work with correcting and improving my English.
Finally I would like to thank Annelle Riberholt for doing the layout work on
the book.
Frede Hvelplund
June 2001
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1. Introduction: Public regulation and re-
newable energy (RE )- political prices or
political quotas ?
Renewable energy, and especially wind power, plays an increasing, and in
some cases, substantial role in energy systems. From being regarded as a
playing field on the fringe of the energy scene, wind power infrastructure is
now entering the electricity scene as an important electricity supplier with, in
2001 for instance, around 15% of the total electricity consumption in Den-
mark. In parallel, the EU’s target is to increase the proportion of RE (ex-
cluding large hydropower) in electricity supply from the present 4% to
12.5% around 2010 (Directive 2000/EC).  
This junction means that public regulation strategies and the political design
of an RE path have secured a growing interest from the large actors on the
energy scene. It has thus become increasingly important for fossil fuel com-
panies to assume the control of and/or to take over the development of RE.
Simultaneously, grassroots groups and producers in that field having gained
more strength and self-confidence, they believe that it is necessary to keep
an organisational momentum linked to groups and organisations that are lo-
cally rooted and independent from the large fossil fuel companies.
Against this backdrop of increased organisational competition, tougher ri-
valry can be witnessed on the discourse-, as well as the legislative- and im-
plementation levels. The manifestation thereof is the present struggle be-
tween two main types of public regulation.
The two main models are:
(a) The “Political price-/amount market1” model, which has politically set
prices for RE electricity, and where the produced quantity of RE elec-
tricity is determined on the market; and
(b) The “Political quota-/certificate price market2” model, where the RE
electricity quantity is politically fixed as a quota, and the RE electricity
prices determined on a market.
                                               
1 The price is politically determined, and the RE-electricity amount is determined on
a market.
2 The amount  (quota) is politically set, and the price is partly determined on the
market, ‘partly’ only, because the price in the new Danish "Political quota-
/certificate price market" system can only oscillate between a politically defined
minimum and maximum.
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The “Political price-/amount market” model has been successful in Spain,
Denmark and Germany, countries that boasted around 80% of the European
wind power production in 2000. In 1999, a law, introducing a "Political
quota-/certificate price market" model for RE, was approved for implemen-
tation around 2003 by the Danish Parliament. In 2000 a new advanced "Po-
litical price-/amount market" model was approved by the German Parlia-
ment, and in 2001, a "Political price-/amount market" model was accepted
by the French Parliament. In parallel, the EU commission, especially the
commission for competition, was working towards the introduction of a sort
of “Tradable Green Certificates” system(EC DG17, 1999).
But recently, in the latest Directive proposal3, which has been accepted by
the Council of Ministers, the Commission has accepted the use of the "Po-
litical price-/amount market" model, and keeps the question of the future
regulation framework open. The “Political quota-/certificate price market"
model then no longer is ‘THE future regulation model’. This development
has lately been supported by a European Court adjudication, which says, that
the German "Political price-/amount market" model is not to be regarded as
illegal state aid, and is therefore acceptable as a way of regulating RE devel-
opment (Case C-379/98).
The "Political quota-/certificate price market" model is mostly supported by
the electricity utilities4, whereas the "Political price-/amount market" model
                                               
3 See Note 1.
4 The association of Danish Electricity Utilities, DEF, strongly supports the model,
whereas the association of European Utilities, Eurelectric, expresses official support.
(See Mr Pierre Inge, in “The market imperative - Eurelectric´s view of the need for
Tradable Green Certificates, the “First International Workshop” on Green certificate
trading in Europe - A new currency for renewable energy?”, Oct. 12th 2000, Radis-
son Hotel, Brussels.) This conference was attended by 180 participants and was
sponsored by the EU Commission and some Utilities.
Premise 1. The arena is open.
Due to its continuation in Germany, Spain, and its introduction in France,
as well as the new EU Directive and the EU Court Decision of March
13th, the "Political price-/amount market" model has become a realistic
candidate as a model for the future EU RE regulation framework. This
conclusion is reinforced by the heavy implementation difficulties encoun-
tered by the Danish "Political quota-/certificate price market" model.
The "Political quota-/certificate price market" model no longer is ‘the
future EU regulation framework’. Other possibilities must be examined.
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is generally advocated by both RE producers and grassroots groups5. The
Green/EFA Group in the European Parliament has been persistently strug-
gling to keep the "Political price-/amount market" type of regulation as a
legal option for EU countries.
The main arguments for introducing a "Political quota-/certificate price mar-
ket" system have been linked to the belief that a system with quota regula-
tion and a price regulated on the market would, due to increased competition
between suppliers of RE, result in getting more ‘value for the money’ of RE.
Upon examining the various arguments and the dynamics of the debate, it is
striking that there does not seem to be any thorough discussion of conse-
quences ensuing for public regulation. Namely, compared to fossil fuel tech-
nologies, RE technologies are characterised by:
a. Having different natural resource bases from location to location, a
factor which makes it necessary to establish a governance system, which
furthers an EU-wide "site efficiency” 6 generating process. The certifi-
cate price market system operates with a "mono-price"7 system, which
takes into account the regional differences in natural resource base
(Chapters 3 and 4).
b. Having a cost structure with a very high percentage of investment-/fixed
costs and very low running costs, which implies high investor risks on
the market, difficulties in establishing a free market as well as the in-
creasing importance of keeping the competition on the equipment market
alive (Chapter 5).
c. Being dispersed around the country, and often in residential areas,
which makes it particularly crucial to involve neighbours and people
from the region in the design, development and ownership of RE projects
(Chapter 5).
d. Being newcomer technologies, thus having minor market shares and
meeting resistance strategies from established technologies (Chapter 5).
                                               
5 In Denmark, the Organisation for Renewable Energy (OVE) is opposed to the 1999
“Green Certificate” law, and, in a press release from May 20th 2001, recommended
that the Danish Government change the RE-regulation back to a "Political price-
/amount market" system.  The Association of Danish Wind Turbine Owners and
Wind Turbine Producers are also very critical of the "Green Certificate law”.
6 "Site efficiency" refers to efficiency linked to the utilisation of a natural resource in
a given location/site.
7 A "mono-price" system is defined as a system with a single certificate market price
for a country, a group of countries and/or the EU as a whole.
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Taking the above two premises into consideration, namely, that the "arena is
open", and that " the specific demands of an RE regulation framework have
not yet been sufficiently examined", it is the aim of this publication to im-
prove the analytical basis for the following important decisions:
1. On a global basis, when dealing with the question of an RE regulation
framework, should one advocate politically regulated amounts (quotas),
combined with prices being decided on a market (the "Political quota-
/certificate price market" model)? Or is it better to determine prices po-
litically and let the quantity produced be regulated on the market (the
"Political price-/amount market model)?
2. Should Danish politicians change the legislation from a system with a
"Political quota-/certificate price market" to a sort of “advanced8 "Politi-
cal price-/amount market" model such as the German (2000) type?9
3. Should the EU consider the "Political price-/amount market" model as a
relevant model for a future EU regulation framework?
4. How should the political system be designed in order to be able to han-
dle ‘radical technological changes’10?
Consequently, we are not only debating which of the above two regulation
frameworks to use, but also how to improve the democratic decision proc-
esses behind these types of discussion.
                                               
8 The ‘advanced’ designation refers to the characteristic of the new German “Politi-
cal price-/amount market" model, whereby price differentiation is a function of
varying RE capacities in different locations.
9 There is still time enough for this transition, since the Danish "Political quota-
/certificate price market" system is to be implemented in 2003.
10 By ‘radical technological changes’ is meant mean such changes as do not only
require technical alternatives, but also entail new institutional and organisational
solutions, which might go, and often do go, against the economic and organisational
/business cultural interests of existing companies within the field in question.
Premise 2. The specific demands of an RE regulation framework
have not yet been sufficiently examined.
There are specific characteristics linked to the development and im-
plementation of RE technologies (see a, b, c and d, above), which
have not yet been included in the discussion of a regulation frame-
work. When negotiating this future regulation framework at the level
of the EU, but also within each EU country, it is a must to analyse
what demands these characteristics will impose upon the frame-
work.
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2. Methodological and theoretical approach
The methodological approach is shown in Figure 1 and discussed in Section
2.1.
The "Political price-/amount market" systems and the "Political quota-
/certificate price market" systems should be regarded as part of a broader
regulation context. The understanding of a relevant context for our present
discussion is described in Figure 2, Section 2.2.
2.1. The main methodological structure
The main structure in the present analysis is shown in Figure 1 below.
(2) Alternative technical
Scenarios
-Energy
Conservation, renewable
energy, cogeneration
(Chapter 5)
(3) Alternative Institutional
Scenarios:
-Financing Conditions, tariffs,
research policy, education
policy, etc.
(Chapter 6,7,8)
-
(4) Political process
- Openness in the public
administration
- Active and well informed
population, etc.
(Chapter 9)
(4b) Economically independent
grassroots lobbyists, the
general public, etc.
(Chapter 9)
(4a) Economically dependent
lobbyists.  fossil fuel
companies, some of the trade
unions, assoc. of Danish
industry ,etc.
(Chapter 9)
(1) Goals
Efficiency with
regard to:
a.  Supply security
b.  Cost and Price
c  Environment
d. Innovation
e .System
development
f .Democracy
g .Competitiveness
(Chapt. 5 )
Figure 1. The "three level analysis" approach
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Figure explanation: The figure shows the goals against which the solutions
should be measured (Box 1), the character of alternative technical scenarios
(Box 2), the necessary institutional reforms in order to implement a given
scenario (Box 3), and the political process behind the design and imple-
mentation of institutional reforms (Boxes 4, 4a and 4b).
It is considered a necessity here to establish a methodology that makes it
possible to see the links between political goals, technical scenarios, institu-
tional reforms and the political processes because:
- The goals should be described, in order to support the prioritisation pro-
cess between various solutions. As can be seen from Box 1, both cost
and price efficiency are mentioned, as producing RE-electricity cheaply
is not sufficient, if market power enables the producer to make
high/excess profits. Innovation efficiency is also included, since the de-
velopment and introduction of new energy technologies may further a
process of inventiveness in a region, an aspect that should be included in
the cost benefit analysis supporting the political decision processes.
- Democratic efficiency11 is especially important in relation to the general
introduction of RE-technologies, as it represents the basic condition for
the development of a culture/organisation of innovation and inventive-
ness in a given region.
- Alternative technical scenarios should be described, as it is impossible
to establish an open democratic debate without having studied the full
spectrum of technical possibilities/alternatives. Furthermore, it is neither
possible nor meaningful to discuss genuine institutional reforms, without
being aware of the link between concrete technical scenarios and the
specific institutional reforms required for the implementation of these
scenarios.
- Alternative institutional scenarios should be outlined in order to pro-
mote a concrete discussion of the financial-, educational-, political- (re-
search policy), administrative-, etc. reforms needed to secure the devel-
opment and implementation of a specific spectrum of technical scenar-
ios.
- The political process behind the development of goals, technical sce-
narios and institutional reform alternatives should also be described. The
discussion of concrete political reforms that can support the ability of the
                                               
11 In a nutshell, we define it as both access to information and access to resources at
an early stage of the technological development process. This usually means that the
State, in addition to a policy of openness before decisions are taken, should allocate
financial resources to grassroots groups that have displayed persistently innovative
efforts within a certain technological field.
13
political system to further the necessary ‘radical technological changes’
should also definitely be on the agenda. It should be emphasised here,
that this discussion is of special interest in periods when it is necessary
to develop and implement new technologies, which are an ‘innovation
risk’ for established companies within the field in question. This cur-
rently is the case in the ‘turning point’ situation on the energy scene. It is
now an explicit Parliamentary goal to decrease the market share of rela-
tively powerful (both politically and economically) companies that are
closely linked to fossil fuel extraction and consumption.
It is also important to be aware that the ‘three level’ analytical model in-
cludes a division of the democratic discourse between ‘economically de-
pendent’ (Box 4a) and ‘economically independent’12 lobbyists (Box 4b).
This analytical distinction is crucial at a point characterised by a need for
‘radical technological changes’. It is foreseeable that this conjuncture
will entail a number of win/loose situations, where the currently power-
ful fossil fuel and uranium based companies are expected to lose market
shares, and where new technologies such as RE and conservation tech-
nologies are bound to gain market shares. Moreover, there is much evi-
dence from experience over the last twenty years in Denmark that the
fossil fuel based companies are faced with huge economic and organisa-
tional setbacks, when it comes to the development and implementation
of the new energy conservation- and RE technologies.
The main analysis in this publication is structured along the ‘three level
analysis’ discussed above, with a discussion of the goals and technical
scenarios in Chapter 5, the institutional scenarios in Chapters 6, 7, and 8
and the political process in Chapter 9. This analysis is performed within
an analytical macrostructure, which is described in the following section.
                                               
12 "Economically dependent" lobbyists are those who have either personal and/or
business interests in given solutions. These usually are the organisations linked to
the established energy companies. "Economically independent" lobbyists do not get
direct personal or organisational economic benefits from one or the other solution.
This would typically be the case of ‘grassroots’ organisations linked to the energy
scene.
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2.2. The analytical macro-structure: Important areas and
mechanisms of governance
Figure 2. The analytical macrostructure linked to important areas of
governance
Figure explanation: Boxes 1-6, 8 and 10 represent important areas of pub-
lic and market regulation. Boxes 7, 9 and 11 represent regulation "precon-
ditions" in the model here. We are naturally well aware that these "condi-
tions" are also changeable and dynamic.
The characteristics of this macrostructure are that:
a. the equipment market (Box 8) as well as the electricity market (Arrows 4
and 5) are included. This is especially due to the fact that some impor-
tant RE technologies, such as wind power and photovoltaics can be re-
garded as energy "automatons", which means that around 80% of the
(7) Goal  Efficiency
with regard to:
(a) Supply security
(b) Prices
(c) Costs
(d) Environment
(e) Innovation
(f)System/”Turning point”
situation
(g) Democracy
(h) Competitiveness
(10) Equipment producers (  In this case renewable
energy and energy conservation equipment)
(8) Equipment payment rules (market)
(O)
Organisational/
Infrastructure
(flexibility)
(f) Technical
Infrastructure
(flexibility)
(1) Electricity
Demand structure
Consumer a
Consumer b
Consumer c
Consumer n
(3) Public regulation
Process/"market"
(A)  Democratic
Process
(B)
Administrative
process
(9) Natural resource base
(a) Fluctuating within days,
months, seasons, years.
(b) Regional variations in
natural resource base.
(11) Historical /
Technological situation
(4) RE-
Quantity
rules
(5) RE-
Payment
rules
(2) RE- investor supply
market  rules
Investor
categories
Conserva-
tion and
RE-supply
Firm 3Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm x
(6) "Flexibility"
payment rules
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value-added that is built into the ‘ab’ plant electricity price can be attrib-
uted to the investment in the RE-plant. The market for equipment is
therefore especially important.
b. the natural resource base (Box 9) is important, as we are dealing with
technologies that are dependent upon a specific natural resource base in
a specific region. This is, to a large extent, a condition which differs
from the basic situation of fossil fuel and uranium technologies, which
depend on a world market price for fossil fuel and uranium, the price of
this resource base being thus almost the same from location to location.
c. The historical/technological situation (Box 11) is especially important,
as we are dealing with a historical situation characterised by fundamen-
tal change, where technologies based upon fossil fuels and uranium are
to be replaced by energy conservation- and RE technologies. This entails
new and relatively specific political and technological problems of
change, which have to be dealt with in the analysis.
d. The “flexibility” payment rules (Box 6) are crucial in a situation of tech-
nological change, where there are daily, weekly, monthly and seasonal
fluctuations in the output of new RE technologies. A technical as well as
an organisational system has to be established, so that this feature of the
new technologies can be taken into account.
e. The public regulation process (Box 3) should also be dealt with, as the
new energy conservation and RE technologies require public regulation
processes that take into consideration the specific "political characteris-
tics"13 of these technologies. As far as wind power is concerned, espe-
cially, it is necessary to take into consideration that people living close
to wind turbines should have the right to own these turbines as a com-
pensation for the potential noise and visual pollution.
The above analytical macrostructure basically differs from the macrostruc-
ture that can be disclosed, when analysing the reasoning and discourse
within and around the Ministry of Energy and Environment regarding the
introduction and implementation of a "Political quota-/certificate price mar-
ket" model in Denmark.
                                               
13 A specific "political characteristic" of wind power is that turbines have to be
placed in windy areas, where, consequently, they are visible for the people living in
the neighbourhood. The Danish experience shows that when local inhabitants and
neighbours are the owners of these turbines, the degree of local political support for
wind turbines is high. Thus, the Danish policy furthering local corporative owner-
ship of wind turbines has so far been one of the "secrets" behind the successful
Danish wind power development.
16
One way of describing the main difference between the present approach as
illustrated in Figure 2 and the approach of the Ministry is that the Ministry
does not seem to take into account the equipment market (Box 8), the spe-
cific characteristics of the natural resource base (Box 9), the specific histori-
cal/technological situation (Box 11), the "flexibility” payment rules (Box 6)
and the specific conditions related to the political process (Box 3). Funda-
mentally, the logic in the Ministerial discourse was, and still seems to be
limited to a discussion of the price aspect of the electricity market (Arrow 5)
combined with some arguments regarding competition and cost efficiency at
the goal efficiency level (Box 7).
Another way of describing the difference between the approach in Figure 2
and the discourse of the Ministry is that the Ministry inherently assumes that
a "Political quota-/certificate price market" model and a "Political price-
/amount market" model have the same impacts upon- and are influenced in
the same way by the historical/technical situation, the natural resource base,
the political situation, the equipment market and the "flexibility” payment
rules (Boxes 11, 9, 3, 8 and 6). The Ministry thus basically holds a "ceteris
paribus" assumption regarding the impacts upon- and influences of the in-
stitutional context on the RE-payment rules in Arrow 5.
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3. The two models
In the following, we will take our examples from the concrete "Political
quota-/certificate price market" model, which was approved by the Danish
Parliament in 1999, and the "Political price-/amount market" model, which
was approved by the German Parliament in 2000. We will describe the two
models in the box (1, 2, 4 and 5) section of the Figure 2 analytical macro-
structure. This means we will be describing the two models in a manner
rather similar to that which has been prevailing in the debate led by the
Ministry of Environment and Energy. We thus exclude any detailed discus-
sion of the surrounding institutional context.
The Danish "Political quota-/certificate price market" model was approved
by the Danish Parliament on May 28th 1999, and is  supposed to be launched
beginning of 2003. One of its crucial features is that politicians will have to
decide upon a quota of RE that should be produced during each of the com-
ing years. The number of years has not yet been decided upon, although the
administration in the Ministry of Energy and Environment believes that it is
necessary to fix a yearly quota for a minimum period of 6-8 years (Ministry
of Environment and Energy, 1999).14 Because of this quota, consumers are
obliged to buy a specific share of their electricity consumption from RE
sources. Thus, on the basis of their expected production, RE suppliers can
sell certificates on the market, where consumers, usually through their elec-
tricity distribution company, will purchase enough certificates to fulfil their
buying obligation. In parallel, the market is responsible for the establishment
of a price for the certificates, which, according to the law, should not be
lower than 1.32 EUR/C/kWh or higher than 3.57 EUR/C/kWh.
                                               
14 It should be emphasised that the above publication does not discuss how one pos-
sibly can establish political quotas for a minimum period of 6-8 years.
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Figure 3. The Danish "Political quota-/price market" model after 2003
Figure 3 illustrates the system, with a politically set quota, and the combina-
tion of a certificate market and a price market for electricity as it is planned
to function after 2003.
For wind turbines contracted in 2000, 2001 and 2002, a payment of 4.36
EUR/C/kWh will be the basic electricity price for a period of 10 years15, as
soon as the European Commission approves the Danish system. Interviews16
with the Association of Wind Turbine Manufacturers and "Jydsk Vindkraft
A/S", a company selling wind power projects, have basically revealed that
no contracts have been undersigned under these new rules. In March 2000,
36 MW wind power was installed, whereas the capacity installed in March
2001 was only 2 MW! The 600 MW of wind power built in 2000 were based
on contracts from before December 31st 1999, when the rules were those of
a "political price-/market amount" model, rules that were much more favour-
able then than after this date. Wind turbine projects contracted before De-
cember 31st 1999 are paid 5,7 EUR/C/kWh for a period of 10 years plus
                                               
15 It has not been decided yet whether these 10 years are 10 years of full load pro-
duction on a reference site or just 10 calendar years. So the rules for investors in
new wind turbines are still unclear in the new Danish legislation.
16 Conducted on May 21st 2001.
Conservation /
RE-supply
Electricity
market
Certificate
Price market
Consumer a
  Consumer b
   Consumer c
  Consumer etc.
Political quota- / amount
The "Political quota-/certificate price market" +"electricity"
market system (Double price market system) .
(4) Price markets
Electricity
demand
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2.24 EUR/C/kWh for the first 12,000 full load hours. Thus, in 2000, the
Danish wind power boom was due to a system with politically set prices for
wind turbines contracted before the end of 1999 and to the very uncertain
and less favourable rules for contracts undersigned after this date.
For the 1999-2003 period, Denmark has a "transitory" regulation framework
based upon a "Political price-/amount market" system, which resembles the
new German "Political price-/amount market system. This transitory model
is interesting, as it combines the Nordpool, the Scandinavian electricity mar-
ket, with a "Political price-/amount market" model, thus obliging the Danish
customers to buy a specific quota of their electricity consumption from green
technologies, such as cogeneration- and RE plants. The "price market" ele-
ment is therefore limited to the share of consumption that is not supplied by
the new green technologies. These are consequently subordinated to an
"amount market" system, which is comparatively, as will be confirmed in
Section 7.3.1, the most efficient market type when dealing with RE tech-
nologies where the main cost share is at the equipment production level.
The German advanced "Political price-/amount market" model, ap-
proved by the German "Bundestag" in February 2000, is characterised by a
politically set price for RE based electricity. For wind power, the price is
9.54 EUR/C/kWh for production from a wind turbine on a reference site17
during 10.4 years, and thereafter 6.48 EUR/C/kWh (Erneuerbare-Energien-
Gesetz-EEG, 2000). If a wind turbine produces more than the reference wind
turbine, it will get the higher price during fewer years. On a very good site,
the wind turbine will only get the higher price for five years. Nevertheless,
the economic advantage derived from placing a wind turbine on a good site
is still clearly greater than placing it in a less windy inland location. On an
inland site, a wind turbine might get the high price for 20 years. The above
prices will prevail during a 20-year period for wind turbines erected in 2001.
It should be mentioned here that, unlike the "Political quota-/certificate price
market" system, the "Political price-/amount market" system can rely on po-
litical prices allocated to a group of wind turbines build in a specific year
(year group of wind turbines), and does not necessarily have to agree upon
any specific price for a coming year group of wind turbines. As mentioned
                                               
17 "The reference site shall be a site determined by means of a Rayleigh distribution
with a mean annual wind speed of 5.5 meters per second at a height of 30 meters.
Source: Annex to the "Gesetz für Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien“ (Erneuerbare-
Energien-Gesetz-EEG). Approved by the German Bundestag on February 25th
2000.
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above, the "Political quota-/certificate price market" system requires a politi-
cal quota decision for a period of minimum 6-8 years in order to establish
the necessary investment security.
Figure 4. The German advanced "Political price-/amount market" sys-
tem
Wind turbines built in 2002 will get a price that is 1.5% lower during a 20-
year period; wind turbines erected in 2003 will get a price that is 1.5% lower
than the 2002 price, etc. Thereby a rationalisation pressure is built into the
German legislation.
The reform was implemented in 2001 and has already proved a success,
since there has been a boom in the building of wind turbines, as well as
photovoltaics systems and biogas plants (Köbke, 2001).
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4. Illusions in the "Political price-/amount
market" versus the "Political quota-
/certificate price market" model discourse
As the discourse is loaded with economic interests, superficial market ideol-
ogy and evasive strategies seem to be replacing the thorough analysis of
market power processes.
Therefore, before entering a more detailed analysis, it is worthwhile to
evaluate three important assertions that have dominated the debate so far:
namely, that: (a) the "Political quota-/certificate price market" system is
more market-oriented, (b) it will develop on a free market, and (c) it will
provide more value for money than a "Political price-/amount market" sys-
tem. These statements are delusions that we shall deconstruct in the follow-
ing.
The first delusion is that a "Political quota-/certificate price market" system,
with its politically set quantities (quotas) and market prices,18 is more mar-
ket-oriented than a "Political price-/amount market" system with politically
fixed prices and amounts produced determined on a market. This delusion
has been very successful indeed, as it now is an almost undisputed ‘fact’ that
the so-called “Green Certificate” trading on the basis of a market plus quota
regulation is ‘THE genuine market’ system. The success of this discourse is
both impressive and ironic, since such a model, with quota regulation plus
some price regulation, is very close to the type of regulation which was
abolished in Eastern Europe after the fall of the communist regimes, some
years ago.
                                               
18 The prices in this system are also politically controlled, as they cannot be higher
than 3,6 EUR/C or lower than 1,34 EUR/C.
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Table 1 illustrates why this is a delusion.
"Political quota
/certificate price
market" model.
(Danish model from
2003)
"Political price
/amount market"
model.
(Present German, Spanish
and French model)
Price determi-
nation
Market and
Political
(political minimum/
maximum price)
Political
Amount de-
termination Political Market
Table 1. Political-, and market determination of price and quantity in two
regulation models
Comment: The price in the Danish "Political quota-/certificate price mar-
ket" model is partly politically defined, since the law determines that the
price should not be below 1,32 EUR/C/kWh or above 3,57 EUR/C/kWh.
As illustrated in the Table, the "Political quota-/certificate price market"
model shows the political interference on the market at both the quantity and
the price levels in the Danish case. The only political intervention in the
"Political price-/amount market" model is at the price level.
The "Political quota-/certificate price market" model is not more liberal or
market-oriented than the advanced "Political price-/amount market" model.
On the contrary, the Danish "Political quota-/certificate price market" model,
due to its 100% State-defined amounts, and partly State-defined prices, is
closely related to the governance frameworks of former East-European
planned economies until around 1990.
The second delusion is the underlying assumption that a "Political quota-
/certificate price market" model will be a free market with competition be-
tween many suppliers meeting many mutually independent buyers. Nobody
knows whether this will really be the case, as nobody seems to have ana-
lysed this question.
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After having examined the discourse under this angle, it is therefore striking
that so many researchers, administrators and utility representatives solely
deal with the bureaucratic and bookkeeping technicalities linked to the intro-
duction of a "Political quota-/certificate price market" system. The questions
examined seem to mainly revolve around: “How can we keep track of the
certificates, so that cheating becomes difficult? How should we concretely
organise the market with regard to the establishment of a market place?” etc.
The analysis of ‘market technicalities’, though undoubtedly important, com-
pletely overshadows any analysis of the power dynamics within such a mar-
ket. “How many suppliers and how many buyers will there be on the mar-
ket?19 Will there be any ownership links between sellers and buyers?20 Will
the market really function like a free market with free competition between
the sellers and between the buyers?” These rather essential questions seem to
have totally disappeared from the discourse.
At present, the EU co-funded “RECert-sim” simulation model is being tested
in 16 different locations all over Europe. The first test took place in Den-
mark, on March 20th, 2001. Some of my written questions21 to the organiser22
were: ”Is it allowed to establish strategic alliances between RE generator
groups? How would this function in the simulation model?” and “Is it al-
lowed to make large consumer purchase associations? What impact does the
establishment of such “consumer cartels” have on the model?
His answer to all of these questions was: “I think we would dissuade this, as
it distorts the market”.
Upon examining the report of the “RECS”, collaboration between a group of
European electricity utilities, it also appears that their work is limited to a
discussion of the technicalities linked to the establishment of a Certificate
Trading system (Christoffersen, 1999). There is neither a discussion of the
potential development and use of market power on the market, nor any de-
bate regarding the appropriate market size and number of actors on the mar-
ket.
After the 1999 electricity law which focused, among many other laws, on the
introduction of a “Green Certificate“ system in Denmark, analyses were
                                               
19 In Denmark, there will probably be 2-3 sellers and a similar number of buyers.
20 In Denmark, a couple of very large “buyer associations”, agglomerates of distri-
bution companies, own the power companies that will be largest suppliers of Green
Certificates on the market.
21 Mail sent to Tim Crozier-Cole on March 7th 2001.
22 Tim Crozier-Cole (E-mail: Tim@esd.co.uk).
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made in order to establish a process of implementation. In 1999, a well
known consultant firm, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, analysed a number of
questions for the Ministry of Energy and ended up with an array of recom-
mendations in their report entitled “Organising a renewable energy market
and trade with green certificates” (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 1999). Here
again, this report only deals with the bookkeeping aspects of certificates and
the technical organisation of the trade, but contains no discussion about the
potential misuse of market power or whether there will be enough actors on
the market to ensure an efficient free market process.
Altogether then, the illusion of a well functioning Green Certificate market
is kept alive by an almost ‘logorheic’ discussion of market technicalities.
Thus any evaluation of ‘the market’ and its dynamics is completely circum-
vented in the current analysis and public discussions.
The third delusion is that a "Political quota-/certificate price market" model
would result in a situation with ‘better value for money’ than a "Political
price-/amount market" model. The European Commission supports this
viewpointi by comparing the price development of RE in the UK “Tender”
system with the German and Danish "Political price-/amount market" system
(European Commission, DG17, 1.
First of all, can one conclude that the UK “Tender” system is more price-
efficient than the "Political price-/amount market" system? From the obser-
vation of price development, one can see that UK prices decreased from
0,068 to 0,049 EUR/C/kWh during the 1990-1997 period, whereas German
and Danish prices did not decrease during the same period. But in the UK,
only around 120 MW wind power infrastructure was built in 1996 and 1997,
whereas 506 MW was built in Denmark and 829 MW in Germany. During
the same period, German development was characterised by an increase in
the proportion of installed inland wind energy capacity, from 13,7% in 1993
to 48% in 1997(Schwenk and Rehfelt, 1999). The seemingly obvious con-
clusion to be drawn from these figures is that, if within  a country that boasts
many good coastal sites, as in the UK example, one only selects a small
fraction of the best of these, one will get very low wind power kWh prices.
The Danish "Political quota-/certificate price market" will not be a free
market with many independent suppliers meeting many independent
buyers. In reality, the number of buyers may very well be limited to 3-5
large buyer associations meeting 2-3 large RE suppliers. In practice, this
might result in negotiated prices, prices that do not at all reflect the dy-
namics of a free market.
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Moreover, if in a country that has many inland sites, such as Germany, one
uses an increasing proportion of these relatively modest wind sites, then
wind power kWh prices will not decrease. Therefore, one cannot conclude
from the figures first quoted that the UK “Tender” system is more efficient
than a "Political price-/amount market" system.
Secondly, the UK “Tender” system does not bear any resemblance to a "Po-
litical quota-/certificate price market" trading system. The UK “Tender”
system results in the winners of the tender getting a fixed price per kWh for
the whole length of the contract period. So, in that sense, the UK “Tender”
system is more closely related to a version of guaranteed price systems,
which also include the "Political price-/amount market" system.
Thirdly, there is competition in the "Political price-/amount market" system,
in the sense that buyers of wind turbines, independently of their guaranteed
prices, try to buy wind turbines from the best and cheapest supplier, where
they get the ‘best value for their money’. This competition has resulted in an
80% decrease in wind power prices from 1980 to 2000.
There is no documentation, whether in the background analyses- or in the
discussions leading up to the approval of the 1999 Danish legislation, re-
garding potential new dimensions of competition, which should provide
‘more value for the money’ in a "Political quota-/certificate price market"
system.
The conclusion regarding this third delusion is that there is no available
analysis or reasoning that could support the hypothesis of getting ‘better
value for money’ in a "Political quota-/certificate price market" system
than in a "Political price-/amount market" system.
On the contrary, as it will be argued in the following, it is probable that the
"Political quota-/certificate price market" system will result in less compe-
tition and more expensive RE based electricity than in a "Political price-
/amount market" system.
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5 The EU state of affairs
5.1 2000-2001 changes furthering an open-ended discus-
sion of the future RE regulation framework
The renewable energy directive. At a meeting of the Council of Ministers on
December 5th 2000, a new RE directive was agreed upon. The directive is
now being processed for the second time in the European Parliament. The
European Parliament now wants binding RE targets for each member coun-
try, instead of consultative ones, as stated in the current text. Furthermore,
the Parliament demands a minimum transition period of 10 years instead of
the seven years suggested in the directive proposal.
It is, therefore, not certain that the directive will be accepted by the Parlia-
ment.
The contents of this directive can be summarised as follows:
1. The Commission refrains from introducing a community wide “Green
Certificate” trading system and accepts the continued use and imple-
mentation of “Feed in” fixed price regulatory systems.
As stated in the EU draft directive explanatory memorandum, “the
Commission has concluded that insufficient evidence exists to provide, at
this stage, a harmonised Community-wide support scheme setting the
price for RES-E (electricity from RE) through Community-wide compe-
tition between RES-E generators, in particular with regard to direct
price support being the most important form of support in prac-
tice”(Directive/2000/EP&EC).
2. The Commission still believes in the advantages of introducing a Union
wide RES-E competition strategy. In the same source as above, one
reads: ”Nevertheless, the Commission believes that this should remain
the objective since its achievement is likely, in the medium-term, to re-
duce prices of RES-E and increase the penetration of RES-E in the in-
ternal market.” The Commission will, no later than 5 years after the en-
forcement of the Directive, present a report on experience gained with
the application of various national support schemes in Member States. A
future Union wide framework for RES-E competition should be de-
signed on the basis of the following principles quoted from the draft di-
rective:
“-Compatibility with the principles of the internal electricity market;
-Consideration of the characteristics of the different technologies;
-Efficiency and simplicity;
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-Inclusion of sufficient transitional regimes to maintain investors’ confi-
dence and avoid stranded costs. (Directive/2000/EP&EC)”
3. The type of RES-E union wide competition system could either be a
“Feed in” fixed price type or a “Green certificate” type, as stated in the
same source: “In fact, on the basis of the existing evidence, it is not ap-
propriate, at present, to conclude that either of the existing models
should form the exclusive basis of an internal market for RES-E.”
4. The indicative objective for the whole Community of a 12,5% share of
electricity consumption from RE sources (excluding large hydro) by
2010 should be pursued. The share in 1997 was 3,2%.
5. It is recommended that a process of RES-E certification be established,
in order to prepare a Union-wide trade framework.
According to the “Community guidelines on State aid for environmental
protection”, the guidelines allows for a subsidy of up to 40% for energy
savings, combined heat and power, and RE, in some cases 50%, when the
investment serves a whole local community, such as on an island for in-
stance (European Commission, Directorate General, 2000). Furthermore,
still quoting from the above source: ”The Commission considers that, where
it can be shown necessary, Member States will be able to grant investment
aid to support renewable energy, up to 100% of eligible costs. The installa-
tions concerned will not be entitled to receive any further support”.
The EU Court decision of March 13th 2000, regarding the German "Political
price-/amount market" law(Judgement of the Court/Case C-379/98, 2001) .
PreussenElectra and its subsidiary, Schleswag AG, had sued the German
Government for enforcing a "Political price-/amount market" legislation
obliging Schleswag to buy electricity from RE sources, especially wind
power, at a specified guaranteed price. They asserted that the law was illegal
state aid and went against EU competition rules.
The Court’s judgement was:
(a) that the legislation is not illegal state aid and
(b) that, ”In the current state of Community law concerning the electricity
market, such provisions are not incompatible with Article 30 of the EC
Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 28EC)“ (Judgement of the Court,
2001). This means that the "Political price-/amount market" legislation is
not in the ‘current state of Community law’ against the EU, as far as
competition on the internal market is concerned.
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Conclusion regarding the EU state of affairs:
The “Green Certificate” trading system has lost momentum since 1998 be-
cause of:
- The introduction of a new German Renewable Energy law, based upon
the "Political price-/amount market" model.
- The introduction of a new French regulatory framework also based upon
the "Political price-/amount market" model.
- The postponement of the Danish “Green Certification” implementation,
- An RES-E Directive that accepts the continuation of the "Political price-
/amount market" model, as it is implemented in Germany and Spain, and
as it is currently practised during the Danish transitional period. The EU
Commission still believes in the establishment of a framework for the
general competition between RES-E producers, but explicitly says, that
this framework does not have to be a “Green Certificate” trading
system.
- The EU Court’s decisions of March 13th allowing for the continuation
of the German "Political price-/amount market" legislation.
Altogether, this means that the certificate model has a much weaker posi-
tion politically on the EU scene in 2001 than it had in 1998-1999, when the
Danish certificate reform was approved by the Parliament. At that time, a
"Political quota-/certificate price market" system was considered the up-
and-coming European Governance framework for RES-E. Now in 2001,
the situation is much more open, which makes it worthwhile discussing
future governance framework(s) without a predetermined development
path.
5.2 The EU goals with regard to RE based electricity pro-
duction
In the EU renewable energy draft directive, it is stated in Article 3 that:
“Member States shall adopt and publish a report setting national targets for
future consumption of electricity from renewable energy sources. Such tar-
gets shall identify the national objectives for future levels of consumption of
electricity from renewable energy sources, in terms of kWh consumed or as a
percentage of electricity consumption, on a year-by-year basis for the next
10 years. They shall be compatible with the objective of 12% of the gross
domestic energy consumption by 2010 set in the White Paper on Renewable
Energy Sources and in particular with the 22.1% share of electricity from
renewable energy sources in the total EU electricity consumption by 2010 as
referred to in Annex 1 to this Directive”(RE Draft Directive/EP&EC/2000).
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According to Annex 1 of the draft directive, this means that RE production
(including large hydro) must increase from 13.9% in 1997 to 22.1% in 2010
of the total EU electricity consumption. During the same period, RE (ex-
cluding large hydro) based electricity production is supposed to increase
from 3.2% to 12.5% of EU electricity consumption. The EU policy therefore
is to further what is called “new renewable energy technologies”23 such as
wind power, biomass, photovoltaics, wave energy, etc. Figure 5 shows the
increase in annual RE-based electricity production (excluding large hydro),
an increase that can be calculated from Annex 1 in the Directive.
EU Renewable energy growth targets        
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Figure 5. Increase in annual RE based electricity production 1997-2010
(excluding large hydro) as expected in Annex 1 of the EU renewable en-
ergy draft directive.
For the EU as a whole, the goal of the directive is that RE-based electricity
production in 2010 be 284 TWh higher than it was in 1997.
As we can see from the above distribution between EU countries, the EU
takes the development of RE sources all over Europe for granted. Germany,
for instance, is supposed to increase its RE-based electricity production by
                                               
23 By “new renewable energy” technologies, the EU generally means “new” in rela-
tion to RE technologies that are already extensively used nowadays, such as mainly
“large hydro” power plants.
31
48 TWh within that period. This goal is very realistic, if inland wind power
sites are included in the plan. Furthermore, it is obvious from Figure 5 that
RE growth is not supposed to only occur in countries with access to good
coastal wind sites, such as for instance, Denmark, Ireland and the United
Kingdom.
On the basis of the above-mentioned EU annex to the renewable energy draft
directive, it is justified to assume that EU policy does count on inland wind
sites in Europe in order to achieve the goals set in the directive.
As mentioned initially, RE technologies are characterised by having differ-
ent natural resource capacities from location to location. A wind turbine on
an inland site in Germany only produces around 50% of the quantity pro-
duced on a very good coastal site in Ireland or Scotland. When dealing with
nuclear-, natural gas- or coal-fired power plants, variations from location to
location will mainly depend upon differences in cooling facilities, with a
coastal site being slightly cheaper than an inland site that requires cooling
towers.
Regarding wind power, this difference is illustrated in Figure 6 below.
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Figure 6. Wind power production costs as a function of the wind site.
Figure comments: 1 MW Micon wind turbine with a 60 meters rotor di-
ameter and a 50 meters hub height. Annual production per 1 MW installed
capacity on wind class 3, 2, 1 and 0 sites is assumed to be respectively
1719MWh; 2358MWh; 2810MWh; and 3934 MWh; investment cost:
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1011655 EUR, maintenance costs/ year: 26796 EUR, interest rate: 7% and
economic life: 20 years. (Source: a combination of data from “Energy and
Environment Data”, Denmark and DWI 1999.)
Wind class 3 represents a typical central European (German) inland site,
wind class 2 a typical Danish inland site and wind class 1 a good site close to
the Danish West coast. Wind class 0 could stand for a very good coastal site
in, for instance, Scotland or Ireland.
It is already worth emphasising that if wind power production on inland sites
is required, and there is only one marketplace and one price for “Green Cer-
tificates” in Europe, the price level needed in order to produce wind power
in Central Europe will be at around 9 EUR/kWh, as some profit is necessary
to stimulate investment. This price would result in very high profits on the
good wind sites, with between 90-160% profits on the good (classes 0 and 1)
sites. Hence the problem of establishing a mono-price market for RE in the
EU. This argument is valid because it is, as discussed above a necessity to
use inland wind sites in Central Europe24. If it were sufficient, in order to
reach the EU energy goal, to only use the good coastal sites in, for instance,
Denmark, Ireland, Scotland, the French West coast, etc., a mono-price mar-
ket might function, as differences between the various resource capacities
used would be relatively small.
When combining the information from Figures 5 and 6, we can conclude the
following:
1. Due to the declared EU goal of increasing the percentage of RE based
electricity production (excluding large hydro) from 3.2% to 12.5% dur-
ing the 1997-2010 period, it is necessary to not only exploit the best
coastal sites for wind power. It is also necessary to use good inland wind
sites all over Europe. This is also due to the fact that the production price
difference between good coastal sites and inland sites is smaller than in-
dicated here, because inland locations are usually closer to consumers,
and therefore require less investments in transmission networks. This
factor is not included in Figure 5.
2. Due to the specific characteristic of RE sources, i.e. that the resource
base varies from region to region, the efficiency of an RE technology
should be measured against its ‘exploitation efficiency’ of the natural
resource base in a given location. It consequently is imperative that the
public regulation framework, which is to be established Union-wide, be
                                               
24 Further development of inland wind power technology is naturally also very im-
portant for Russia, Ukraine, China, etc.
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flexible enough to allow for competition in the efficient use of a given
natural resource in a specific region.
In the following chapter we will discuss how the latter could be done, by
comparing different public regulation frameworks.
34
35
6. Renewable energy: the case of public
regulation in a situation with differences in
the natural resource base
In our model union, we have three countries: Country 1, Country 2, and
Country 3. They have decided to form a union, and to co-ordinate their ef-
forts with regard to energy- and greenhouse gas policy.
Figure 7. The areas discussed in this chapter
Source: Figure 2.
The analytical macrostructure guiding this chapter are pointed out by means
of the stars, indicating that, in this chapter, we mainly deal with the electric-
ity market (Arrows 4 and 5), the conservation and RE supply (Box 2), goal
efficiency (Box 7), and the natural resource base (Box 9). A case-study ex-
ample provides the framework for our discussion.
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6.1 The wind resource situation (a case example)
Three countries have examined their resource situation. With regard to wind
power resources, they have drawn up the cost- and resource curves shown in
Figure 8, using the data from Figure 6.
Wind power costs pr. kWh with equal 
technological resource efficiency in three 
countries.
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Figure 8.   Wind power production costs in the three countries
Comments: The wind sites belong to the four categories described in Figure
6.
The characteristics of these resource curves are:
The countries have found the energy problems linked to pollution from the
use of uranium- and fossil fuel based electricity production so serious, that
the entire 200 TWh yearly wind power production should be used. They
therefore have decided to establish a common regulation framework in order
to ensure a dynamic, socio-economically efficient and innovative develop-
ment of these resources.
In the process of trying to define this common regulation framework, the two
following governance models will be examined:
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1. The "Political quota-/certificate price market" model, where the amount
of RE is decided upon by politicians and the price is determined on the
market. This model is currently being introduced in Denmark.
2. The "Political price-/amount market" model, where politicians determine
the price of RE and the quantity of RE is determined on the market. This
was the former Danish model, and is the present Spanish, German and
French model.
Here, in Chapter 6, we will discuss these two governance systems, using the
above case study combined with a “neo-classical” cost and price analysis.
Our main analytical focus will be on which models result in the highest so-
cial cost linked to the implementation of a given RE amount. Linked to this,
it should be emphasised, that the introduction of the “Political quota-
/certificate price market" model is often motivated by arguments stating the
need for competition and cost reduction linked to RE implementation. In the
current debate, power companies, especially, claim that the politically "Po-
litical price-/amount market" model does not maintain cost reduction pres-
sure upon the owners of wind turbines and wind sites.25
6.2 The "Political quota-/certificate price market" model
In the "Political quota-/certificate price market" model, the amount of RE-
electricity is politically regulated by a quota, and the price is determined on a
market for electricity. A similar system was approved by the Danish Parlia-
ment in 1999, and its implementation is planned around 2003.
This system should be seen in relation to the "Political price-/amount mar-
ket", where the price is regulated politically, and the quantity regulated on
market. This system is sometimes also called the “fixed price system”, and is
the system which is used in, for instance, Germany, Spain and France, and
which will be used in Denmark until around 2003.
In Figure 9, the three countries have introduced a common "Political quota-
/certificate price market" system. Linked to their different wind resources,
this governance system entails the following wind power cost functions and
profits for wind site- and wind turbine owners:
                                               
25 See, for instance, page 2 in “Stromthemen”, nr. 4, April 2000. (Publisher:
Informationszentrale der Elektrisitätswirtschaft e.V. Postfach 700561, 60555
Frankfurt am Main.)
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Figure 9. Costs, profits and prices in a union wide “Green Certificate”
market (case example)
Source: Figure 6 data regarding production costs.
Further assumptions: 10% risk premium due to fluctuating prices. 20% profit
demand on a wind class 3 site.
The Figure shows that, on this market, there is a single price for wind power
all over the Union, namely the one settled on a case Union (European) cer-
tificate market26. Politicians have established a quota system, which ensures
that an annual production of 200 TWh RE-electricity is secured. In order to
reach this TWh goal, it is necessary that the kWh price on the market is at
least high enough for it to be profitable to use wind class 3 sites, which con-
cretely translates into a price slightly above 8 EUR/C/kWh. Additionally, the
fluctuating prices on the certificate market imply that the investors demand a
10% risk premium, increasing the price to 9,8 EUR/C/kWh.
It is theoretically possible to establish a process of implementation, where
the best coastal sites, wind class 0 and 1, are used in the first phase, wind
class 2 in the next phase and in the final phase, wind class 3. According to
this model then, Germany should not make its inland sites operational until
the good coastal sites in Denmark, Ireland, Scotland, etc., have been fully
exploited. This theoretical possibility would imply lower certificate prices in
the first phase, which would then increase in the second phase, ending up at
the Figure 5 level during the last phase. There are good arguments against
this type of strategy. The technical argument is that “inland” wind power
technology is, in a broad sense, very different from coastal wind power tech-
nology. Inland wind turbines are designed differently from coastal site wind
                                               
26 In order not to complicate the argument, we assume, that the basic price for elec-
tricity, underlying the ‘Certificate price’, is the same in all three countries.
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turbines; the infrastructure around the wind turbines is not the same, etc.
Therefore, it is necessary to begin the technological development process of
inland wind technology and its infrastructure concurrently with the devel-
opment of coastal wind technology.
The important message here, though, is that, independently of whether wind
power development is extensively pursued with the simultaneous imple-
mentation of inland and coastal wind turbines, or in phases linked to wind
site capacities, as described above, the final situation will be the one illus-
trated in Figure 9.
The conclusions regarding this "Political quota-/ Certificate price market"
system are the following:
a. The model is characterised by introducing competition between power
producers union-wide. If we were dealing with fossil fuel technologies,
where power plants function on the same resource base from country to
country, it might prove a good model27. But it certainly is not compatible
with RE resources, which vary from location to location. In the RE case,
competition should further the most efficient use of a given natural re-
source in a given location.
b. The “Political quota-/certificate price market" system offers no possibil-
ity of price differentiation between very good and relatively poor, but
politically necessary wind sites28. Consequently, the margin of profit in-
dicated in Figure 5 is unnecessarily high, because all three countries get
the necessary price to stimulate the investments needed on the poorest
sites. Thus the wind site-/wind turbine owners in coastal zones will par-
ticularly benefit from this system.
c. The model does not afford the possibility of having higher payment pr.
kWh in the first, for instance, 10 years of production, and lower payment
pr. kWh, when the debt has been paid back, for a given RE plant. This
means that old, out of debt wind turbines get the same payment pr. kWh
as new indebted wind turbines.
d. The model does not allow for the possibility of giving a higher payment
pr. kWh for RE-plants built in 2001 than for RE plants build in 2002,
2003, etc. It is not suitable for a process of adapting prices in accordance
                                               
27 Even in this case, the deregulation of power companies often degenerates into the
establishment of power production oligopolies, and poorly functioning markets. The
experience from California and the UK emphasises this problem.
28 Wind sites, which are needed in order to fulfil both the politically defined CO2
reduction goals and the goals with regard to establishing supply security.
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with RE productivity- and cost reduction development aim29. The "Po-
litical quota-/certificate price market" model has to announce production
quotas 6-8 years in advance, in order to establish a minimum of market
stability. These annual quotas will result in a price, which has to be the
same, independently of RE plant year group.
e. Linked to the above problem, it will become almost impossible to launch
new technologies with initially very high costs in a "Political quota-
/certificate price market" system. A high quota, established in order to
obtain the necessary high prices, would have to remain even after a pe-
riod with costs and price reductions. This is especially problematic in the
initial stages of the given RE technology's entrance in the market.
f. Due to the very high profits made by owners in coastal zones in general,
the cost pressure upon firms producing wind turbines will be relatively
low. This lack of cost pressure is reinforced by the quota system, where
the wind turbine industry generally has no motivation to lower its costs,
as the quantity of wind power capacity sold is decided upon politically
and not determined on the market. For the wind turbine industry as a
whole, the only way to increase its profits will be to lower production
costs and to increase prices. We are naturally aware that, as long as
wind turbine manufactures do not collaborate on the market, some form
of price competition will remain between them. But the motivation to
establish “strategic collaboration” between wind turbine manufacturers
will be much higher in a “Political price-/amount market" system than in
a "Political price-/amount market" system, where “turnover” can be in-
creased by lowering prices and production costs.
e.  Due to the large consumer paid profits made by owners of old wind tur-
bines and owners of wind turbines on good coastal sites, a political re-
sistance against wind power will develop.
In Figure 9, 200 TWh of wind power are produced per year. Table 2, below,
shows the accumulated payments, profit, average kWh price and profit rate
in the Figure 9 situation.
                                               
29 The new German "Political price-/amount market" model includes a 1.5% (pr.
year group of RE plants) reduction in payment pr. kWh, from 2001 to 2002 and
from 2002 to 2003, etc. Productivity gains are thus furthered and anticipated in this
model.
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a. Production costs 10428 mil. EUR
b. Profit due to “mono-price” regulation framework   6972 mil. EUR.
c. Risk premium caused by fluctuating prices   1740 mil. EUR
d. Total payment for 200 TWh 19140 mil. EUR.
e. Average price pr. kWh 9,57 EUR/C
f.  Profit as a % of production costs 83%
Table 2. Annual economic consequences of the "Political quota-/certificate
price market" (mono-price model) for a production of 200 TWh (case exam-
ple)
Source: Figure 9 data, among other aspects, the distribution according to
wind site; with wind class 0: 15%; wind class 1: 30%; wind class 2: 25% and
wind class 3: 30%. The costs are drawn from the figures behind  Figure 3.
N.B.: 200 TWh/ year is close to the EU directive goal of 284 TWh by the
year 2010. Thus the figures in this case study could represent a yearly pro-
duction around 2007 in the ‘EU scenario’.
6.3 The advanced "Political price-/amount market"
model: politically set prices and market determined RE
amounts.
6.3.1 The characteristics of the advanced "Political price-/amount
market" model
"Political price-/amount market" models, until 1999, were characterised by
basically one politically guaranteed price per kWh, and a market determin-
ing the quantity of RE-based electricity. This system was competitive in the
sense that any buyer of a wind turbine would buy the “best value for money”
wind turbine. As there were no politically set quotas, wind turbine producers
could, as a group, sell more, if they were able lower their wind turbine
prices. This system resulted in a decrease of Danish wind power costs per
kWh of around 75% from 1981 to 1997. The advantage of the system was
price security and competition, but its disadvantage was a single price, inde-
pendent of the wind site. The above ‘first generation’ "Political price-
/amount market" system was a ‘mono-price’ system like the “Political quota-
/certificate price market" system. The main differences between these two
systems is that, due to guaranteed prices, the "Political price-/amount mar-
ket" system circumvents the need to pay a risk premium to investors and that
the absence of a politically set quota promotes competition between wind
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turbine suppliers. But, basically, the first generation "Political price-/amount
market" system did not secure the main aim of establishing a competition
process, which generates “site efficiency”. By “site efficiency” we mean
efficiency with regard to exploiting a given natural resource in a given loca-
tion.
As a part of the present reforms on the energy scene, a "Political price-
/amount market" system has been developed in Germany. It is still a system
with politically designed prices, and a market determined quantity, but it in-
troduces price differentiation between sites with different resource bases. In
this respect then, it is a further development from the first generation ‘mono-
price’ "Political price-/amount market" systems, which were in use in, for
instance, Denmark and Germany until 1999.
We call the model “advanced” because of its ability to foster a competition
process, which increases “site efficiency” in a non-bureaucratic way30. This
model is currently being introduced with the new German RE law, where RE
will get a higher payment for a 10.6 year period of production on a reference
wind site, i.e. for wind turbines erected in 2001: 17.8 Pf/kWh (9,54 EUR/C).
During the rest of the wind turbine lifetime, the payment will be 33% lower,
e.g. for wind turbines built in 2001: 12.1 Pf/kWh (6,48 EUR/C)(EEG, 2000).
Furthermore, the kWh payment is lowered by 1.5% pr. year, so that a wind
turbine built in 2002 will get 17.8 Pf/kWh minus 1.5%, that is 17.5 Pf/kWh
annually.
Thus, according to the new rules, a wind turbine built in 2011 will get 17.8
Pf/kWh divided by (1 + 0.015)10 = 15.34 Pf/kWh during the high price pe-
riod, and 10.43 Pf/kWh during the low price period. Prices will thereby put
pressure on wind turbine producers to make them introduce innovations and
lower their production cost. In Figure 10, the effects of this type of regula-
tion are illustrated.
                                               
30 It is worthwhile mentioning, that the UK tendering system could in theory be
called an ideal system, in the sense that it potentially fosters the pursuit of site effi-
ciency in a detailed way, as the auction is linked to a specific wind site. Meanwhile,
unfortunately, the UK system seems too bureaucratic and unable to ensure sufficient
wind power capacity. The advanced ”Feed in” system might secure site efficiency
without the bureaucratic disadvantages of the UK system.
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Figure 10. The advanced "Political price-/amount market" model and
its wind site dependent price framework.
Comments: The columns, elaborated on the basis of figures drawn from
Figure 6, show the annual wind site production pr. MW of wind turbine ca-
pacity. The down-sloping curve shows the number of years during which the
wind turbine owners are paid the high price. In Germany, the high price
will, as mentioned above, be 9,54 EUR/C/kWh and the low price 6,48
EUR/C/kWh for wind turbines erected in 2001. A wind turbine on a good
coastal site will only get the high payment for 5 years (the low price there-
after), whereas a wind turbine on an inland site will get the high payment for
20 years.
6.3.2 The cost and price efficiency of the advanced "Political price-
/amount market" model
The price performance of the advanced "Political price-/amount market"
model is shown in Figure 11 for the three countries.
The Figure displays exactly the same cost structure as in Figure 9. The only
difference is that the advanced "Political price-/amount market" model has a
politically defined, site dependent price framework, which makes it possible
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to decrease the profit on good wind sites without destroying the economy of
inland wind sites.
Cost and profit in a "political price-/market amount" model
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Figure 11: Price, profit and costs in the “Political price-/amount mar-
ket“ model. (case example)
(Politically fixed, site dependent price linked to the performance of a refer-
ence wind turbine: the German model)
Assumptions: The same costs/kWh as in Figures 6 and 10. Profits are a
percentage of costs: 40% on wind site 0, 35% on wind site 1, 30% on wind
site 2 and 20% on wind site 3. These profit percentages are approximations
of the profits that we have calculated on the basis of the new German prices.
Since prices are politically guaranteed, there is no need for any risk pre-
mium.
As illustrated in Figure 11, this advanced fixed price model makes it possible
to lower the profit margin on good wind sites, without destroying the econ-
omy of poorer wind sites, a requirement that has been politically defined as
indispensable to achieve energy policy goals.
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In this case 200 TWh are produced pr. year. Table 3 below shows the total
payment, the total profit, the average kWh price and the profit rate for one
year.
a. Production costs 200 TWh RE-based electricity
production.
10428 mil. EUR
b. Profit   2923 mil. EUR
c. Total payment for 200 TWh. 13351 mil. EUR
d. Average price pr. kWh          6,68 EUR.
e. Profit as a percentage of production costs   28%
Table 3. Economic consequences of the advanced "Political price-/amount
market" model. (Case example)
Assumptions: Figures drawn from Fig. 11
As can be observed, this model, with politically set, site dependent prices,
results in a “multi-price” system, thus avoiding excess profit on good wind
sites.
To conclude, we can say that:
a. This model is, to a much greater extent than the "Political quota-
/certificate price market" model, a market model, as there is no politi-
cally set quota. Therefore, there still is a motivation for wind turbine
producers to increase market volume by lowering production costs.
b. The advanced "Political price-/amount market" model makes it possible
to lower the profit for wind site- and wind turbine owners in favourable
locations, without destroying the wind turbine economy of poorer sites,
which it is a political goal to exploit.
c. The advanced "Political price-/amount market" model allows for a
lower payment to older, out of debt wind turbines without eroding the
economy of new wind turbines.
d. The model can, as it is done in the German model, be used in a process
of gradually reducing the kWh payment from RE year group to year
group, and in that way motivate and anticipate RE productivity gains.
e. The model puts a higher cost pressure on wind turbine producers selling
wind turbines to good wind sites, than the "Political quota-/certificate
price market" model. This is because the model is close to a wind site
dependent price, instead of the general price of the "Political quota-
/certificate price market" model, which is determined by the poorest
wind site on the market within the established quota.
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f. Due to the lower payment for RE in this model, and the absence of ex-
cess profits for wind site- and wind turbine owners, the political accep-
tance of wind power will be easier to achieve.
g. It is worthwhile mentioning that our simulations of the German “ad-
vanced Feed in-amount market” model show that the profits from wind
turbines on coastal wind sites are still far higher than on inland wind
sites. This model therefore still fosters a relatively strong motivation to
seek the best wind sites for wind turbines.
h. Due to the flexibility of the system, the price relationships can be con-
structed so that it is possible to create a common price formula for the
EU, if it is politically desired.
6.3.3 Comparison of the advanced "Political price-/amount market" model
with the "Political quota-/certificate price market" model
In Figure 12, the price and cost structures of the advanced "Political price-
/amount market" model and the "Political quota-/certificate price market"
model are compared.
.
Figure 12. Price and cost structures of the advanced "Political price-
/amount market" model and the "Political quota-/certificate price mar-
ket" model. (Case example)
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Source: Figures 9 and 11. The Figure illustrates the costs linked to the
‘mono-price’ structure of the "Political quota-/certificate price market"
model, where it is inevitable that the market pays the same price for RE on a
good wind site as for wind power produced on an inland site.
Table 4 summarises the economic differences between the two regulation
frameworks:
The "Political quota-
/certificate price mar-
ket" model
The   advanced "Political
price-/amount market"
model.
a. Production costs
200 TWh RE based
electricity.
10428 mil. EUR  10428 mil. EUR.
b. Profit   8712 mil. EUR  2923 mil. EUR
c. Total consumer
payment for 200
TWh.
19140 mil. EUR  13351 mil. EUR
d. Average price pr.
kWh
  9,6 EUR/C/kWh    6,7 EUR/C/kWh
f. Profit as a % of
production costs 83% 28%
Table 4. Comparison of the economic consequences of the “Political quota-
/certificate price market model” versus the advanced "Political price-
/amount market" model. (Case example)
Comments: The difference is mainly due to the fact that the "Political
quota-/certificate price market" model” is a ‘mono-price’ model with poten-
tially heavily fluctuating prices, whereas the advanced "Political price-
/amount market" model is characterised by predictable prices and the ad-
aptation of prices to local natural resources.
When examining the above analysis and conclusions, it is worthwhile em-
phasising that we are dealing with a static methodology, which does not in-
clude an analysis of the dynamics on the market, and the interplay between
market, innovation, local acceptance of wind turbines and the political proc-
ess. An analysis including the institutional context shown in Figure 2 is
needed for such analysis by listing the actors on the market scene, and es-
tablishing theories regarding the interrelationship between these actors. This
type of analysis will then come into play with the price developments de-
scribed above. One could for instance imagine that the high profits linked to
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good wind sites in the "Political quota-/certificate price market" model could
result in local political resistance against wind projects and/ or that politi-
cians would abstain from increasing the quota, if prices on the market rose
too much. These types of questions will be dealt with in the following chap-
ter, by means of the Danish example.
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7. An institutional analysis of RE governance
models.
This publication began with an emphasis on four main problems, which
should be taken into consideration when establishing a RE institutional
framework. In the above analysis, we have dealt with the important charac-
teristics linked to RE, namely the various natural resource backgrounds in
different regions.
The other three main features of RE technologies are:
a. The cost structure problem
The cost structure is characterised by about 85-90% investment costs,
and only 10-15% running costs. Thus, once a wind turbine has been
built, one is dealing with a technology with a “stranded cost” percentage
that is far higher than in a fossil fuel power plant. This results in very
high investor risks on the market. What effects then will this cost aspect
have on the development of competition on the market?
b. The problem of decentralised inconveniences linked to RE
RE, and especially wind power, is characterised by being difficult to
conceal, and often has to be distributed in a given area within the vicin-
ity of a number of communities. This means that a lot of people will feel
the visual and, in some cases also, noise inconveniences linked to, for
instance, having a biomass- or wind power plant in their neighbourhood,
whereas the direct31 pollution effects linked to nuclear-/ fossil fuel tech-
nologies are much more centralised and concentrated upon a few sites
like Gorleben, The Hague, various coal and uranium mines, etc. One can
naturally install offshore wind power systems away from residential ar-
eas, but their total output would not be sufficient to supply whole conti-
nents with electricity and energy. Furthermore, such concentrated pro-
duction of wind power would make it necessary to build huge high-
tension power lines.
c. The ‘newcomer’ technology problem
This problem is especially linked to the lack of know-how as well as
cultural and economic motivation with regard to the implementation of
RE-technologies among the established nuclear and fossil fuel based
                                               
31 By ‘direct pollution effects’ we mean the environmental drawbacks linked to
having a power plant, a high-tension transmission line, a nuclear waste deposit in
one’s close neighbourhood.
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techno-organisations32. So politically as well as institutionally, RE tech-
nologies face organisational resistance from strong and well-established
actors on the energy scene. This ‘factor’ should be seriously taken into
consideration when defining the selection criteria presiding over the
choice of an appropriate RE institutional framework.
These types of questions, among others, will be discussed using the Danish
case.
The reasons for changing the Danish system from a "Political price-/amount
market" system with political price regulation to a system with political
quota regulation are to be found in the following quotation, drawn from An-
nex 14, Ministry of Environment and Energy, Dec. 8th, 1998:
“The quota market will replace the present system of fixed prices for pay-
ment of RE current as well as the subsidy for electricity production, which
has lead to new wind turbines being economically overcompensated. In their
evaluation report of March 1998, the Council for Energy and Environment
recommended that this inexpedient application of subsidiary funds be
changed”(Ministry of Environment and Energy, 1998, p.44).
The hope was to thereby establish a sort of competition on the RE market,
fostering a situation where “more value for money” would be obtained. Nev-
ertheless, the Ministry of Energy does not provide any descriptions of
mechanisms that could promote this cost reducing process.
Thus the argument in the above quotation is weak, since the problem of
”overcompensation” is not at all solved by a shift to a "Political quota-
/certificate price market" system. As we have shown in the preceding chap-
ters, it is quite the opposite.
                                               
32 By using the concept of ‘techno-organisation’, we are emphasising the fact that
organisations are closely linked, economically as well as culturally, to the character
of the technique they promote. Organisations are therefore purpose-designed and
built around their technique and are often unable and/or lack the motivation to im-
plement other techniques.
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7.1 The Danish “Political quota-/certificate price market”:
a double price market system combined with a politically
fixed quota
The components of the double price market are:
Component 1: A "Political quota-/certificate price market" system is es-
tablished, where consumers are obliged to buy a certain quantity of RE. A
market for “Green certificates” is introduced, where a producer of RE gets a
green certificate, which can then be sold to the consumers, so that they can
fulfil their quota obligation. The “Green Certificate” quotas for a given
number of years are fixed by the Danish Parliament. The law has established
price limits, so that the certificates cannot be cheaper than 10 øre/kWh (1,34
EUR/C) or exceed 27 øre/kWh (3,6 EUR/C). The “Green Certificate” price
will therefore oscillate between 10 and 27 øre/kWh.
Component 2: A spot market for electricity, where RE based electricity is
sold. With reference to average 1999 prices (10 øre/kWh (1,34 EUR/C), this
would mean prices oscillating between 18 øre/kWh (2,34 EUR/C) and 37
øre/kWh (4,96 EUR/C), depending on the certificate price. (In practice, the
oscillations would have been greater, since, in 1999, the Nordpool price was
fluctuating around the average, 10 øre/kWh). This is around 50% of the price
paid today, and below the level where it can be expected that new windmills
will be built. No new contracts have been signed under these new terms in
2001.
The Nordpool spot market price is an enemy of any innovation, since it mir-
rors the short-term marginal costs of fossil fuel technologies on a market
with periods with a massive excess of large hydro and fossil fuel capacity.
At present, the spot market price is close to the short run marginal cost
linked to coal-fired plants, which is around 10 øre/kWh (1,34 EUR/C).
In the following, we will discuss a series of problematic spheres, which
should be included in the regulation discussion of RE in one or the other
market versions.
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7.2. The institutional analysis
(The institutional context in which the RE-governance system is embedded)
This analysis is called an institutional analysis because it emphasises the in-
stitutions in which the market is embedded. If one considers Figure 13 be-
low, it is noticeable that it is linked to former analyses in Figures 9, 10 and
11, in the sense that it enumerates a number of institutions, within which the
cost and price formation processes described in these Figures take place.
Figure 13. A relevant33 institutional context around RE governance sys-
tems.
Figure explanation: The Figure is a version of the overview Figure of
Chapter 2, which especially focuses upon the interrelations between the
public regulation process (Box 3), the investor supply market (Box 2), the
equipment market (Box 7) and the conversion and flexibility market (Box 6).
The specific interest of this chapter thus resides in an analysis of the links
                                               
33 In relation to energy policy goals, and the four RE characteristics described in
Chapter 1.
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between the above areas, and the "Political quota-/certificate price market"
governance system.
As mentioned in chapter 2, the approach used by the Ministry of Environ-
ment and Energy has been to avoid analysing these links.
The most important messages in the Figure are the following:
(a) It is necessary to examine both the market for electricity and its
“Green Certificates” (Box 4), and the market for energy equipment
(Box 6).
In the background analysis for the reform, only the less important of
these two markets, the market for electricity, was discussed.
Furthermore, it should be underlined that within the market for electric-
ity, as it is illustrated in Box 4, the new Danish regulation represents a
“Double price market” with both an electricity- and a “Green certifi-
cate” market.
(b) “RE-investor supply” and its composition do matter (Box 3).
(Boxes 3A and 2a are connected to each other by the dotted arrows that
display the importance of the links).
The areas thus linked provide a description that makes it possible to dis-
cuss a series of interrelated questions such as:
-the importance of discussing the connections between the people who
reap the economic benefits from investing in RE (e.g. wind power), and
the people who carry the potential burdens linked to noise and visual in-
conveniences. One way of “solving” this problem is to fuse these two
groups by supporting a policy centred on neighbour- and local owner-
ship. Furthermore, this discussion is linked to the political process in
Box 3A, indicating that people’s political acceptance of RE plants will
depend on the extent to which some of the economic benefits are given
to the people who carry the burden.
-the importance of discussing the need for “price stability”, when want-
ing to secure the financing of RE plants by means of the services of local
banks. Securing this financing possibility is essential, when wanting to
keep neighbour and local investors sufficiently strong to survive compe-
tition on the investor market.
-the importance of recognising that neighbour and local investors, due to
their economic and cultural independence of fossil fuel companies,
among other factors, have been the innovators and initiators34 of invest-
                                               
34  On Feb. 1st 1999 in Copenhagen, S. Auken, the minister of Energy, said at a
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ment in Danish RE during these past 25 years. There is thus also a link
back to the descriptions of both the character of political processes fur-
thering the innovation potential within this field, and the policy influ-
ence on the composition of the ”investor supply”.
(c) The study of market power does matter.
When analysing the effects of changes in public regulation, it is crucial
to be able to take a closer look at the concrete characteristics of devel-
opment on the market, especially with regard to monopolistic and/or oli-
gopolistic tendencies. Figure 13 illustrates, by means of the black arrows
between the demand and supply sides that, at present, the demand side
(distribution companies) is the owner of the supply side, i.e. the power
utilities and distribution companies, which can also build RE plants. This
is the case in the present Danish system, but there are similar ownership
links in all the Northern European electricity service supply systems.
The above ownership links naturally cause huge problems with the es-
tablishment of market control by large fossil fuel based actors, making it
possible for these to squeeze out investors35 who do not have a strong
capital background and ownership connections to the demand side.
(d) The infrastructure for electricity conversion and production flexi-
bility should be analysed, as it is essential for the economy of RE tech-
nologies
                                                                                                             
meeting with Tage Dræby, Hans Bjerregård, Frede Hvelplund, and the chief of his
department, Leo Bjørnskov, as well as others from the department, that we had now
reached a level where development could no longer be “driven by 12 idealistic
schoolteachers”. With this colourful metaphor, he hinted that it was now time for big
capital and large companies especially, to invest in “offshore wind power” develop-
ment. The assumption behind this statement, whereby technological development is
now out of the reach of local people and their creativity, does not seem to be well
grounded, especially when one considers the big problems linked to the present util-
ity driven (ELTRA and ELKRAFT) model of exporting surplus wind power to
neighbouring countries. The technological alternative to this export model is to inte-
grate the fluctuating RE sources locally. This strategy might well prove much more
efficient than the utility driven export model, and the creativity and support of the
“twelve schoolteachers” is certainly required to develop and implement this local
integration.
35 Due to the cost structure of RE production (e.g. wind power), characterised by
both high capital costs (85-90% of costs) and low running costs (10%), low price
periods will drive investors with a weak capital background to bankruptcy. This
state of affairs may then potentially result in small investors being bought up by big
investors with a strong capital background, such as the large utilities.
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The economy of RE sources and especially wind power is a function of the
technical infrastructure in which the particular RE is embedded. Wind
power-, photovoltaic- and wave energy production varies according to the
amount of wind-, sun- and wave energy. When the RE proportion of total
electricity production is lower than around 5-10%, these variations will be
absorbed by the electricity system. When the proportion of RE rises above
this percentage, and there is, as in the Danish energy system, a very high
proportion of cogeneration, there is, and will  continue to be a tendency to-
ward surplus energy production, due to wind- and heat bound electricity
production. The excess production periods will typically be cold windy
winter weekends, during which the wind- and heat bound electricity produc-
tion is high and the electricity consumption low.
With almost 50% of the heat consumption based upon cogeneration of heat
and electricity and 15% of total electricity production from wind power, the
Danish electricity system has reached a boundary with several periods of
"excess" wind- and heat bound electricity production. This "problem" will
increase in parallel with reaching the official Danish goal of producing at
least 50% of electricity by means of wind turbines around 2030.
The present official strategy to solve this "problem", i.e. huge electricity ex-
ports during windy periods, entails the risk of very low sales prices for wind
power. A scenario built on an increasing proportion of forced export at low
prices will probably result political resistance against wind power and make
a CO2 reduction policy increasingly difficult to champion. The present suc-
cessful expansion of wind power capacity in Northern Germany, producing
electricity during the same periods as Denmark, reinforces this "problem".
Another strategy is to use wind power in regional systems, consisting in heat
pumps linked to cogeneration, flexible regulation of cogeneration units and
the establishment of cogeneration- and wind turbine systems, which, on their
own, can already stabilise the grid. This strategy will make it possible for
Danish system operators to decide when to import and when to export elec-
tricity. At present, this type of system is being discussed in Denmark and
seems to be much more promising economically than the current official ex-
port strategy (Lund, 2001).
Linked to the above discussion, it is important to analyse to what extent a
well functioning competition exists between various technical solutions. This
is crucial with regard to the establishment of a flexible infrastructure, which
results in a politically acceptable economy for RE technologies in general
and for wind power in particular. The "Infrastructure, conversion and flexi-
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bility market" should therefore imperatively be included in the analysis (Box
6 in Figure 13.)
7.3 Comparison of the “Political price-/amount market”
with the “Political quota-/certificate market”model
7.3.1 “Liberalizing” a dwindling market and “bureaucratising” a growing
market
In a "Political price-/amount market" system” there is a politically set price,
and a quantity of available RE decided on the market. Consequently, wind
turbine manufacturers can increase the amount of wind turbines sold by de-
creasing their sales prices.
In a "Political quota-/certificate price market" system, with politically fixed
quotas and prices determined on the market, there might be some short-term
price competition on the market between existing suppliers of, for instance,
wind power. Meanwhile, the quantity of politically determined wind power
may have been settled for the following 6-8 years (Ministry for Environment
and Energy, 1999), which entails that wind turbine producers cannot influ-
ence the turnover by lowering prices. In fact, the only strategy enabling wind
turbine producers to increase their turnover in a "Political quota-/certificate
price market" system is to increase prices, since the quantity to be sold year
after year is the consequence of a political decision36.
The structure in Figure 13 then illustrates that a certain degree of ‘market
liberalization’ is established on the electricity “double market”, (Box 4). In
parallel, the existing market regulation system for energy equipment (Box 6)
is replaced by a bureaucratically regulated quota system, which removes the
competitive motivation of equipment producers (e.g. wind turbine producers)
to lower their sales prices. So what happens, seen within the structure in
Figure 13, is that some ‘market liberalization’ is achieved on the electricity
“price market”, (Box 4). In parallel, the existing market regulation system
for energy equipment (Box 7) is replaced by a bureaucratically regulated
quota system, which removes competition between equipment producers’
(e.g. wind turbine producers), a competition necessary to lower sales prices.
                                               
36 Nevertheless, there is a certain political motivation to lower prices, since too high
prices might encourage popular support to other solutions.
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Whether this is an important problem or not depends upon actual develop-
ments on the market. One of the general market structural changes is the
probable decrease of value added on the market for electricity and the likely
increase of value added on the market for energy equipment, seen as a pro-
portion of the sales price at the consumer level. Concretely, the change to
some types of RE systems, such as, for instance, wind power, represents an
automation of electricity production, with 85-90 % as investment costs and
the rest as maintenance costs. Once the wind turbine is built, nobody works
on it. It just produces electricity for 20-30 years, and is usually maintained
by service units linked to wind turbine factories. This entails that the wind
turbine will not work more efficiently because of competition with other
wind turbines on the electricity market.
In a traditional electricity service supply system, the situation is totally dif-
ferent. At least in theory, one might expect that market competition on the
electricity market might put pressure upon the power utilities, which will
then dismiss some of the people employed at the power plant. A wind tur-
bine can dismiss no one, once it is built. Any potential personnel compres-
sion can then only happen at the level of the wind turbine factory, because a
wind turbine is in principle an energy automaton.
At present, fossil fuel back-up systems are still being used, but in the future,
a system with different types of storage techniques, such as for instance hy-
drogen storage, might be developed. These systems also appear to be “auto-
matic storage systems”, which hardly require any maintenance performed by
employees in an energy organisation.
Thus the market for electricity is declining in importance, whereas the
market for energy equipment is becoming increasingly crucial.
The existence of a market for equipment and a market for electricity, as dis-
cussed above, is therefore especially significant during the ongoing techno-
logical change, when the value-added chain changes and when fossil fuel
systems are replaced by RE- and energy conservation systems. This change
in value added is illustrated in the discussion below, and in Figure 14:
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Figure 14. Change in value added profile, in the transition from a fossil
fuel based system to a system based on RE- and electricity conservation
Source: Hvelplund, 2001.
Figure explanation: The “Indirect electricity system”, as represented by the
upper and lower V boxes, constitutes the energy equipment needed for a
certain sales volume at consumer level. The "Direct electricity supply sys-
tem”, as portrayed by the upper and lower IV Boxes, constitutes the system
usually conceived of as the electricity system.
In the upper IV and V Boxes, the coal-based fossil fuel system, the indirect
electricity system, sub-boxes 5, 6 and 7, has only 46.7% of the value-
added/sale in box 8 (Hvelplund, 2001). The "Direct Electricity supply sys-
tem", box IV, has  53,3% of the total value-added in this coal-based system.
In the lower box IV and V, the renewable energy system, the indirect elec-
tricity system, boxes 3, 4 and5, has a value added of 82% of the turn-
over/sale in box 6 (consumer payment). The “Direct Electricity supply sys-
tem”, box IV, here has an accumulated turnover amounting to 18% of the
turnover at the consumer level.
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In Table 5, the relative importance of the market for equipment is compared
within a fossil fuel system and RE-/electricity conservation system.
Equipment market Electricity Market
Fossil fuel systems 47% 53%
RE- and electricity
conservation systems
81% 19%
Table 5: Moving from fossil fuel to RE means a change in value added from
the electricity market to the equipment market.
Conclusion: In the above discussion, and as shown in Table 5, we have been
documenting the argument whereby the present technological change of di-
rection from fossil fuel based systems entails a development that shifts the
value added away from the electricity market, (Box 4 in Fig. 13). Interest-
ingly enough, it is also this diminishing market that is sought after and liber-
alized by means of the present “double market” reform.
In parallel with this, the value-added percentage is increasing on the market
for energy equipment.
It is therefore no less significant, that the 1999 electricity law that regulates
this expanding market, abolishes the existing “market forces” and replaces
them with a “quota” based bureaucratic regulation model.
But why is the latter important, when seen in relation to energy policy goal
performance? At the beginning of Section 4.1, it was argued that the "Politi-
cal price-/amount market" system did not entail less “market competition”
than a "Political quota-/certificate price market" system with politically fixed
amounts (quotas) and a price fixed on the market. Meanwhile, the arguments
above indicate that the conversion to the "Political quota-/certificate price
market" system represents in fact a decrease in “market competition”, since
the new system introduces market forces on an market arena that is losing
importance, and abolishes market forces on the other promising arena. Seen
in relation to policy goals, the purpose of introducing markets is mainly to
cut down on costs.
But the new system introduces a market at the electricity market level,
where there are almost no costs to cut, and abolishes a market at the
equipment market level, where the largest part of the costs are clearly de-
termined, when dealing with electricity production from RE automatons.
Therefore, it is reasonable to deduce from the above arguments and analysis
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that the new Danish “double market” system does imply a goal performance
reduction with regard to increasing competition and cost efficiency.
Finally, the present technological changes away from fossil fuel based sys-
tems should foster a development that shifts the value added away from the
electricity market (Box 4 in Figure 13), to the equipment market (Box 7 in
Figure 13). This concretely spells a change from a fossil fuel power plant
system, where the number of employees at the power plant can be reduced
due to increased competition, to a system consisting of energy automatons,
hardly requiring maintenance once the wind turbine is erected. The “Political
quota-/certificate price market" model represents an increased price compe-
tition between energy robots that will not allow for cost reduction, as no em-
ployees can be fired. At the same time, the quota system linked to this model
severely weakens competition between the producers of these energy
automatons.
7.3.2 The "Political quota-/certificate price market" system and the so-
cio-economic costs of renewable energy
Our comparison with the advanced "Political price-/amount market" model,
in Section 6.3.3, indicates that this model has far lower public service costs
linked to introducing RE than the “Political quota-/certificate price market"
model.  The main question then is, to what extent a regulation framework
has the ability to secure that a public service payment is minimised, seen in
relation to the energy policy goal to be achieved. The conclusion is:
In the present situation of technological change, the "Political quota-
/certificate price market" system ends up introducing price competition
on a dwindling market and abolishing market competition on an ex-
panding market.
The "Political price-/amount market" is increasing market competition
on the growing market for equipment, and is therefore especially well
suited to the present period of technological change.
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7.3.3 Abolishing price stability and the decreased local and neighbour
participation
(The effects of price fluctuations and market dominance on the double elec-
tricity market)
The advanced "Political price-/amount market" model with politically set
prices, and the amount fixed on the market generates competition on the
equipment market.
Although the price is almost guaranteed for a 10-15 years period at least, the
investor will want to buy the wind turbine at the lowest possible price. Con-
sequently, as there is competition on the equipment market, a system with
fixed prices is basically cost sensitive. Therefore, despite the fact that in
such a system, the price of wind turbine electricity is to a large extent politi-
cally defined, once it has been determined, the market functions, and creates
competition on the equipment market. In that sense, one could categorise it
as a rather non-bureaucratic version of the UK tender system. It is thus not
The disadvantage encapsulated in models like the "Political quota-
/certificate price market" model, which hand over price control to the
market, is that it becomes almost impossible to establish a time- and natu-
ral resource dependent price (public service payment).
In this model, consumers pay a considerable amount of “wasted” public
service payment to, for instance, windmill owners, who would have erected
the windmill even if they had only got the high public service payment
during the period when they were paying their loans back. In a "Political
quota-/certificate price market" model, it might be necessary to pay the
wind turbine owners 27 øre/kWh in public service payment throughout the
whole lifetime of a windmill, whereas in a system with politically fixed
prices, the payment could already be lowered after, for instance, 7 years
on good wind sites.
The advantage of the advanced "Political price-/amount market" model is
that, by placing political regulation at the level of prices and letting the
market regulate the amount, the public service payment can be regulated
over time and taking into account differences in the natural resource base.
Politicians can thus regulate the amount by lowering or increasing the
prices.
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incidental that wind power cost pr. kWh has been reduced by more than 75%
since 1981.
A. The "Political quota-/certificate price market" double market system re-
sults in heavily oscillating prices and a loss of energy policy goal perform-
ance.
The electricity market: As mentioned above, the electricity price on the
Scandinavian Nordpool market, fluctuates between 1 and 4 EUR/C/kWh,
depending on the amount of rain, which then determines the amount of
available hydropower. Furthermore, depending on the degree of investment
in surplus capacity, prices fluctuate between the long-term and short-term
marginal costs plus profit. The years around 2000 are characterised by ex-
cess capital. This then results in electricity prices on the Nordpool market
that, on average, are far below the long term marginal costs of electricity
production.
Furthermore, as we shall see below, the electricity market is not a free mar-
ket, and the largest actors on the energy scene can quite easily manipulate
prices.
B. Fluctuations in wind resources: Due to wind resources varying from one
year to the next, wind power will fluctuate within a margin of 30%. The
Danish year 2000 wind power capacity of 2500 MW, would for instance un-
der 1994 wind conditions, produce 1500 GWh more in one year, than under
1996 wind conditions.
If the goal of 50% wind power electricity is to be reached around 2025-2030,
the annual increase in wind power capacity will have to be between 200 and
250 MW, which, around 2005, will be only 7-8% of the installed wind
power capacity. In 2015 the annual increase in wind power capacity will
only be around 5% of the total wind power capacity. This means that the
normal annual fluctuations in wind velocity will clearly exceed the annual
wind power quota.
The price of certificates will therefore be a function of wind speed and not of
political decisions with regard to the amount of wind power that should be
installed. Consequently, the price of Green Certificates will oscillate be-
tween 10 to 27 øre/kWh (1,32 and 3,57 EUR/C/kWh) depending on the ac-
tual wind energy resource of the year in question.
C. Cost structure of wind power: Considering total costs, wind turbines are
characterised by having high construction costs and low running costs. The
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long run marginal cost (LRMC) is 4-6 EUR/C/kWh, whereas the short run
marginal cost (SRMC) is below 0.5 EUR/C/kWh
D. Development of market control and price manipulation.
In Denmark and in most other countries where there are ownership relations
between power producers and distribution companies, one cannot describe
the market as free. In Figure 28, this link is illustrated by the black arrows
inside and under Box 6, between the “demand units”, which are simultane-
ously the electricity distribution companies and the present owners of the
power companies. In Jutland-Funen, these distribution companies are al-
ready closely collaborating in the ELFOR37, and are at present undergoing
comprehensive fusion processes.
When a market consists of a supply, which, due to weather conditions, heav-
ily fluctuates, combined with a supply cost structure as described above,
prices will continuously be very sensitive and vary between the short-run
marginal costs and the long-run marginal costs. Wind turbines, for instance,
will continue to produce, even when the kWh sale price sinks to 0.5
US/C/kWh. But in this case, there will be insufficient resources for long-
term maintenance and amortisation of the loans, and windmill owners with a
weak capital background will face bankruptcy.
In such a system with heavily fluctuating prices, which are very sensitive to
minor changes in supply and demand, the prices of Green Certificates can be
manipulated by minor changes in the supply of- and demand for RE. When
this is combined with a market, where the demand organisations own the
power plants, which are large suppliers of RE based electricity, there is a
combination of economic motivation, technical possibility and sufficiently
asymmetric power on the market to allow strong actors to exert price ma-
nipulation. As the proverb goes, “Opportunity makes the thief”. From a so-
cial sciences point of view then, if no price manipulation occurred under
such conditions, it would provide a really interesting organisational ‘excep-
tion’.
We therefore come to the conclusion that the market will not become a free
market with many suppliers and many buyers. Consequently, the political
discussion can no longer be concealed behind the utopia of a future "free
market". It is a necessity, for practical as well as scientific reasons, to discuss
questions such as: which types of associations will be formed and who will
the dominant actors be? Who has the best strategic position on this type of
                                               
37  An association of power distribution companies in Denmark.
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"Political quota-/certificate price market" system, and how will the most
powerful actors manipulate prices and long- term technological develop-
ment?
As may be deduced from the discussion above, even a small amount of sur-
plus capacity may lead to a big drop in prices. Large mergers of buyers may
have an interest in such price drops, as long as they own only a small part of
the wind turbines currently on the market. In fact, the utilities only own 20%
of the wind power capacity today, which means that they have to buy 80%
from external producers. By just creating a minor excess of wind turbine ca-
pacity compared to the green quota, a steep drop in the wind power price
could be induced; from around the level of the long run marginal costs
(LRMC) to the level of the short run marginal costs (SRMC). Consequently,
a number of privately and co-operatively owned wind turbines would go
bankrupt, and the utilities or other strong agents on the market might be able
to buy them at low prices. Because the green quota is known, it will not be
difficult to define the extra capacity that would need to be established. The
Competition Council could, in theory, keep this potential for manipulation at
bay through bureaucratic control, with a demand for account separation be-
tween distribution and production activities.
In practice, however, it is very difficult to control whether there is a real
separation of costs, if the technicians and the engineers of a distribution
company-owned wind turbine factory and the distribution company itself are
employed by the same management and work in the same buildings.
It should be mentioned, that hitherto in the “Political price-/amount market"
model, the Parliament has kept the price for non polluting electricity stable,
and it therefore could not be easily manipulated by the strongest actors on
the market.
We have thus analysed a system in which:
- the price base, i.e. the Scandinavian Nordpool prices, fluctuates greatly,
due to the variation in rainfalls influencing hydropower, in combination
with a cost structure with large differences between short-term marginal
costs and long term marginal costs in the basic capacity of coal-, nu-
clear- and hydropower. The wind power supply fluctuates within a 30%
margin, due to wind resources changing from year to year.
- the cost structure of e.g. wind power is characterised by around 4-6
EUR/C/kWh in long run marginal costs and 0.5 EUR/C/kWh in short-
run marginal costs, combined with assets, the lifetime of which is 20 to
30 years.
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- large actors, especially the old fossil fuel organisations, are, due to own-
ership relations, in a position where they can manipulate the prices of
RE.
The “double market system” will be characterised by heavily oscillating and
manipulated prices.
The worst consequence related to oscillating and manipulated prices is
that the traditionally small and innovative investors, neighbour and local
investors, will leave the investor market for three reasons:
-Firstly, they will find it difficult to get loans from the local banks, since
they can only show very fluctuating and insecure price/income prognoses.
-Secondly, they might not dare to invest, as, generally, they do not have the
capital base making it possible for them to survive several years with excess
capacity and short-term marginal pricing on the electricity markets.
-Finally, they might not want or dare to enter a market, where it is rather ob-
vious, that large actors are in a position to manipulate prices.
The consequences of loosing neighbour and local investors from the
“investor supply group” are:
- Fewer investors and decreased investor competition resulting in more
expensive RE.
- Declining technological innovation, as an economically independent
and innovative investor group has left the RE scene.
- As the only investor group that supplies a form of compensation to the
ones who carry the burden leaves the market, the local political resis-
tance against RE will increase.
A main problem linked to the loss of independent investors is that the re-
maining investors have no economic or organisational motivation to invest
in RE plants, as these have to compete with the short-term marginal costs
of fossil fuel plants in the present excess capacity situation. Thus there is
no serious investment incitement amongst the remaining investors.
Therefore, without neighbour- and local investors, the public service
payment for RE will increase. The political resistance will also increase,
and both the support from local people and their innovative commitment
will be lost.
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8 Renewable energy and system integration
When discussing how different regulation mechanisms work in relation to
specific goals, it is not sufficient to only be aware of the general characteris-
tics of the organisations that should be regulated. It is also necessary, as in-
dicated in the Figure above, to circumscribe the specific technical historical
configuration, within which the change is taking place. There is no doubt
that a need has arisen to change the regulation within the electricity supply
system in such a way that it can absorb the fluctuating RE sources in order to
avoid having to sell wind power at extremely low prices on the market (in
the Danish case the Nordpool market).
The technical regulation possibilities are mainly outside the scope of wind
turbines, which have to operate when there is wind energy. Consequently, it
seems logical to continue giving wind power producers a fixed price pr. kWh
of wind power produced.
Some technical regulation possibilities are described as a combination of
decentralised cogeneration units, heat storage systems, heat pumps, hydro-
gen systems, cogeneration and wind generators, which are able to stabilise
the grid (Lund, 2001). Henrik Lund has, in Energidebat 2001, compared a
system infrastructure characterised by a combination of investment in high
tension grid capacity and RE- electricity export, with a system infrastructure
comprising heat pumps, flexible cogeneration units, grid stabilising RE-
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plants and cogeneration units, etc. The result of this comparison is that the
latter system, where the amount of forced RE electricity export is close to
zero and where RE-electricity, to a very large extent, is regionally absorbed
in Denmark, has a distinctly better economy than a system characterised by
heavy investments in high tension lines combined with forced export, during
periods with a more significant production of wind- and heat bound electric-
ity.
In his scenarios for 2015, 25%38, that is around 9 TWh, of the entire Danish
electricity production, is provided by wind energy. In an infrastructure able
to absorb the wind- and heat bound electricity, the annual gain, seen in rela-
tion to the "forced export" strategy, will be around 1.2 EUR/C/kWh wind
power produced.
The technical infrastructure in which RE-technologies are embedded is
therefore fundamentally meaningful for the economy of RE systems. The
significance of this infrastructure increases in parallel with wind power
gradually reaching a relatively high proportion of the total electricity con-
sumption. In Denmark, wind power represents 15% of total electricity con-
sumption in 2001, combined with a cogeneration production amounting to
50% of heat consumption. Denmark has therefore reached a level where a
modernisation of the energy infrastructure has to be developed and imple-
mented.
From a governance point of view, the current strategy is to regulate both by
the building of more high-tension transmission lines and by letting the large
coal-fired power plants be the regulating units. At present, the 1999 Elec-
tricity Law endows the companies responsible for system regulation with a
regulation monopoly. This means that regulation capacity is bought from
large coal-fired power plants, which are very slow when it comes to techni-
cal regulation, whereas the speedier regulation process that could come from
decentralised cogeneration units is not currently exploited.
In this context, it is not surprising, that ELTRA, which is responsible for
system regulation in Jutland-Funen, is currently buying regulation power
from large power plants, because these are owned by the very distribution
companies that own ELTRA. Additionally, it should be emphasised that this
company, responsible for system regulation, is a non-profit monopoly, which
                                               
38 In 2000, wind power represents 15% of the total electricity consumption. So it can
be expected that 25% will be reached before 2010, if a reasonable governance sys-
tem is introduced.
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get all its costs covered by consumers. This means that it does not have any
economic incitement to find regulation solutions that are cheaper than the
“large coal fired power plant plus high tension lines“ solution.
It is crucial then that the 1999 Danish electricity law be changed according
to the following main guidelines. It should secure that the companies respon-
sible for the system, such as ELTRA in Jutland-Funen and ELKRAFT in
Zealand, become both economically motivated and obliged by law to ac-
tively work toward the establishment of a regulation system that does not
force the owners of RE plants to export during periods with very low prices.
The present technological monopoly, linked to the “forced export" regulation
model combined with the compulsory consumer payment toward the expan-
sion of high tension lines and regulation by means of the large coal fired
power plants, should be replaced by a competitive system.
E. Münster describes an interesting proposal for a type of competitive sys-
tem. He suggests that the company responsible for the system elaborate
prognoses for purchase and sales prices for the coming five days as well as
prognoses for the next 12 hours. By means of an electronic information net-
work, the "market" will then react towards the prognoses, and the latter will
be relatively rapidly improved upon, thanks to a learning process both at the
level of decentralised producers and consumers and at the level of the prog-
noses maker, i.e. the company responsible for the system (Münster, 2001).
Thus, all these scattered units will be “free” to react upon the information
concerning central regulation and production needs, since it will be accu-
mulated at a centralised level.
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The conclusion is that the innovative organisations, which might estab-
lish new and cheaper regulation strategies, do not have the legislative
right or the economic motivation to establish these new regulation
strategies.
 Economic incitement is lacking since any electricity consumer pays the
same price for regulation services and high-tension lines, independently
of how extensively or not these services are used. Thus, if a group of
consumers were able to decrease their use of high-tension lines by
means of local regulation activities, they would have to pay double
price, namely both for the regulation service provided by the company
responsible for the system and for their local regulation investments.
When this situation is combined with these companies’ lack of economic
motivation and cultural willingness to utilise the regulation potential of
decentralised cogeneration plants, the development of new regulation
possibilities is curbed.
Therefore, there is now a need for changes in the electricity law, mak-
ing it economically possible to engage in local and regional regulation
investments, thereby avoiding the expensive current regulation linked
to increased high tension line capacity combined with large coal-fired
power plants.
A system of regulation, where the need for regulation accumulated at a
centralised level is diffused down to decentralised producers and con-
sumers, should be elaborated in order to establish a competition ena-
bling the utilisation of regulation facilities at a decentralised level.
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9. The Danish discussion and decision proc-
ess behind the introduction of a "Political
quota-/certificate price market" system
In this chapter we are dealing with the political process behind the develop-
ment of a new institutional renewable energy governance framework in
Denmark (Figure 1, boxes 4, 4a and 4b, as shown below).
(2) Alternative technical
scenarios
-Energy
Conservation, renewable
energy, cogeneration
(Chapter 5)
(3) Alternative Institutional
Scenarios:
-Financing conditions, tarriffs,
research policy, education
policy, etc.
(Chapter 6,7,8)
-
(4) Political process
- Openness in the public
administration
- Active and well informed
population, etc.
(Chapter 9)
(4b) Economically independent
grassroots lobbyists, the
general public, etc.
(Chapter 9)
(4a) Economically dependent
lobbyists.  Fossil fuel
companies, parts of the trade
unions, assoc.of Danish
industry ,etc .
(Chapter 9)
(1) Goals
Efficiency with
regard to:
a.  Supply security
b.  Cost and Price
c  Environment
d. Innovation
e .System
development
f.Democracy
g .Competitiveness
(Chapt. 5 )
9.1 Purpose and theoretical approach
The main question in this chapter is: How should the political system be de-
signed in order to be able to handle a situation with extensive "radical tech-
nological changes" within the energy area?
In order to construct some answers to this question, we will analyse the
Danish decision-making process behind the May 1999 approval of an Elec-
tricity law encompassing the introduction of a "political price-/amount mar-
ket" system in Denmark.
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The background that frames the question is the comparison made in the pre-
ceding chapters of two different institutional frameworks designed to further
RE-electricity development and implementation. We call this institutional
level the "first order"39 level. Here we will examine the political process,
which designs these institutional frameworks. We call this political level the
"second order"40 level. As already mentioned in Chapter 2, we are dealing
with a paradigmatic technological change away from fossil fuel and uranium
technologies to energy conservation- and RE technologies. This change is a
"radical" technological change, as it is characterised not only by requiring
technical changes, but also organisational changes. The last twenty years of
"energy evolution" history in Denmark have shown that new actors and new
organisations are needed as innovators, since they are free from economic as
well as organisational binding to the fossil fuel and uranium technologies
(Hvelplund, et al, 1995).
Generally speaking, in this situation of change, fossil fuel- and uranium-
based actors do not have any comparative advantages. Due to their stranded
costs both with regard to hardware- and software investments as well as their
organisational culture, they are faced with a number of comparative disad-
vantages. Consequently, they are generally in a win/lose situation, where
they are losing market shares, turnover, profits and jobs, in order to be suc-
cessful with RE technological development. This state of affairs usually
makes them resist systemic changes away from fossil fuel and uranium tech-
nologies. The common attitude is, "We are against change now, since we
have excess capacity, but if politicians, nevertheless, require it, we will be
the ones making it happen".
Concurrently, with their resistance to this "innovation risk", these companies
are in a very strong political and financial position, which makes them able
to heavily influence the political process (Hvelplund and Lund, 1994). In this
situation of change, it is interesting to see to what extent the "second order"
institutional framework, i.e. the central administration, the Parliament and
surrounding democratic institutions, has the ability to support an innovative
development furthering new green technologies and their organisational
connections. Or is the situation such that the central administration and the
                                               
39 By "first order" institutional framework we mean the institutions that are in direct
contact with the implementation actors, such as the RE-electricity buyers, sellers,
equipment producers, etc. The preceding analysis dealt with this "first order" insti-
tutional regulation system.
40 By "second order" or "meta" institutional framework we mean the framework that
designs the "first order" framework. This is usually the central administration, the
Parliament, the institutions participating in the democratic process.
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Parliament are subordinated to the fossil fuel and uranium technocratic
structure and are designing policies that mainly support the organisations
within this structure?
Methodologically, the present analysis will mainly rely upon written mate-
rial from the Ministry and concrete reactions to suggestions emanating from
various interest groups. The analysis is closely linked to the process behind
the Parliamentarian approval of a change in the Danish RE-governance
framework from a "Political price-/amount market" to a "Political quota-
/certificate price market" system and structured in relatively close accor-
dance with the methodology elaborated in Janis’s "Groupthink". The ap-
proach is shown in Figure 15. 41
                                               
41 Based on a figure in Janis, Irving L., "Groupthink", Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1982, p. 244.
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Antecedent Conditions                   Observable consequences
                  +
                  +
                  +
Figure 15. Theoretical analysis of groupthink
Source: Partially based on information from "Groupthink" (Janis, 1982).
Comment: The structure of the approach is to look at both the symptoms of
defective decision-making (Box F), and some potential causes in Boxes A-E.
The main differences between the above Figure, and Janis’s figure, are the
following:
- We believe that it is necessary to focus upon the links between the Min-
istry and various external lobby groups. In relation to this, it is consid-
ered of particular importance to keep track of the connections between
the Ministry and respectively, the lobbyist groups with or without eco-
nomic dependency as far as the questions discussed are concerned. Con-
F. Symptoms of
defective Decision-
Making
1.Incomplete survey
of alternatives
2.Incomplete survey
of objectives.
3.Failure to examine
risks of preferred
choice.
4..Failure to
reappraise initially
rejected alternatives.
5. Poor information
search
6.Selective bias in
processing
7.Failure to work out
contingency plans
8.Weak democratic
process/lack of dia-
logue.
E. Symptoms of
groupthink
Type I. Overestimation
of the group
1.Illusion of invulner-
ability
2. Belief in inherent
morality of the group
Type II. Closed mind-
edness
3.Collective rationali-
sation
4.Stereotypes of out-
groups
5."Mono-paradigm
behaviour".
Type III pressures
toward uniformity.
6.Self-Censorship
7. Illusion of unanimity
8.Direct pressure on
dissenters
9.Self-appointed mind-
guards
A. Decision   makers con-
stitute a cohesive group
B. Structural faults of the
organisation.
1.Insulation of the group
2.Lack of tradition of im-
partial leadership
3.Lack of norms requiring
methodical procedures
4.Homogeneity between
members, etc
C. Provocative situational
context
1.High stress from external
threats.
2.Low self -esteem due to
-recent failures
-excessive difficulties in
current decision making
etc.
G. Low probability of
successful outcome
D. External connections
1.Biased connections to
external groups.
2.External economic inter-
ests
etc.
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sequently, we have added Box D, External connections, to Janis’s origi-
nal figure, focusing on (1) potentially biased connections to external
groups and (2) external economic interests. This addition is in keeping
with our assumption about the paradigmatic technological change we
have described above.
- Furthermore, in the same spirit, we have found it useful to examine the
Ministerial ability to avoid a "mono-paradigm" behaviour, by which we
mean the behaviour characterised by a single way of looking at the
problem area. Therefore, under Box E, we have added Point 5, "Mono-
paradigm behaviour". This point is important due to our understanding
of the situation of change as a paradigmatic change, requiring technical
as well as organisational changes on both the "first order" and "second
order" institutional levels.
- Finally, we consider the inclusion of "the public" necessary  in order to
further any "radical technological change". "The public" does not have
particular economic interests linked to any specific technology, and
therefore can be regarded as economically independent. Consequently,
"the public", by means of its "organisation", the Parliament, is the po-
tential carrier of innovations. Hence, we have added Point 8 in "Weak
democratic process/lack of dialogue", Box F, to Janis’s original figure.
9.2.  Symptom analysis with regard to the decision process
The decision process can be divided into two phases, namely:
I. the discussion before the Parliamentary agreement regarding a new
electricity law, on March 3rd, 1999 and
II. the implementation analysis and discussions from August 1999 to De-
cember 1999.
The two phases outlined above already point towards one of the basic flaws
in the decision, which was that the main analysis came after the decision was
made instead of before, and that this analysis was consequently limited to a
discussion regarding how the law should be implemented and did not include
a debate on whether the governance construction was feasible.
9.2.1. The discussion before the parliamentary agreement on March 3rd,
1999
A. The viewpoints and analysis of the Ministry of Energy and Environment.
The "reform group" within the Ministry of Energy and Environment listed
some central elements of a future electricity reform in a February 9th, 1998
paper entitled "Discussion Draft for an Energy Reform". In this paper, a
number of problems linked to the Danish "Political price-/amount market"
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model are described in a rather unspecified way. The "Political price-
/amount market" system is described as:
- "old-fashioned and working against environmental as well as economic-
efficiency goals, and
- inefficient because of differences in RE-electricity prices paid by various
distribution companies, resulting in a process where wind turbines are
not built on the best sites"(Energistyrelsens reformgruppe, 1998).
The recommendations in the above paper are rather unclear, although the
system with RE-quotas and RE-Certificates is mentioned. Furthermore, it is
recommended that the consumers pay for the RE public service payment di-
rectly, via the electricity price. This move is recommended in order to re-
move RE payment from public finances.
The first relatively clear proposal regarding the future electricity reform was
published in August 1998 as a paper emanating from the same reform group.
This paper contains a section called "The establishment of a green quota
market", where the proposed "Political quota-/certificate price market" sys-
tem is briefly outlined, with the following characteristics:
- Consumers will be obliged to buy a certain RE quota,
- RE producers will get "Green Certificates", and
- a market for these "Green Certificates" will be established.
It is worthwhile to note a specific formulation in this working paper, namely:
"As the decentralised development with biomass and inland based wind tur-
bines will typically be implemented by many, smaller agents, it will be ap-
propriate to organise a market for green electricity"(Energistyrelsens re-
formgruppe, 1998). This statement is telling since it exposes the assumption
of a market with many suppliers. This 1998 “wishful-thinking” belief in a
well-functioning market survived until the parliamentary decision of March
1999.
A few months after this decision, this trust in a well functioning market had
disappeared from the "Report on the Danish green certificate market": "The
Danish Wind Turbine Owners Co-operative, a limited liability co-operative,
and the power companies can be expected to significantly dominate the mar-
ket during the first years. As electricity consumers are simultaneously
obliged to purchase green certificates, it is possible for the dominant suppli-
ers to take advantage of their market position to achieve monopoly prof-
its"(Ministry of Energy, 1999).
The discussion on the electricity reform intensified during the Autumn of
1998, when fragments of the arguments behind the reform came to public
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knowledge. During a conference in September 199842, the Minister of En-
ergy, Svend Auken, underlined that the "Green market" should ensure that
“we reach our RE goals in an efficient way", and that a "Certificate market
[should] provide better opportunities to sell the Danish RE-electricity on the
international market". Another paper from the Ministry of Energy mentions,
"that in order to ensure a cost efficient RE-development, a market for green
electricity" should be established. In the same paper, the Ministry of Energy
writes: "A well-functioning green market implies many actors and market
transparency"(Energystyrelsen, 2/12/1998).
During December 1998 and January 1999, there was a rather active debate
going on between some Parliamentarians, grassroots organisations and sci-
entists, urging the Ministry of Environment and Energy to answer a number
of questions. In an important two and a half pages note, a month before the
parliamentary decision, the Energy Administration compares the "Political
quota-/certificate price market" model with the "Political price-/amount mar-
ket" model. The main drift of this note is a glorification of the "Political
quota-/certificate price market" model with arguments such the following:
(a) "Both RE electricity producers and buyers can take advantage of the
flexibility on a future market for electricity. Both producers and buyers
of RE-electricity get incitements to pursue cost efficiency and to mutu-
ally adjust production and consumption".
(b) In a "Political quota-/certificate price market" model all the actors on the
market are incited to strive for cost efficiency. Efficiency incentives are
created in all the segments linked to the market for RE- electricity".
(c) If, in a "Political price-/amount market" model a price should be paid,
which would secure a certain quantity of RE electricity, this price should
be changed until it had the right level. Consequently, there would be in-
security regarding the price. In this model, the price insecurity is to a
higher degree political than in the "Political quota-/certificate price mar-
ket" model (Ministry of Energy and Environment, 29/1/1999). (The ar-
guments are here directly translated, but perhaps unclear. Author’s note.)
(d) "A "Political quota-/certificate price market" model only makes sense, if
the price is not set centrally, but is determined on a market, between
supply and demand."
It is very difficult to discuss the argument in this paper, as there is no back-
ground analysis indicating the assumptions behind its short statements. As
                                               
42  Speech given at the IDA conference regarding the electricity reform, Sept. 7th,
1998.
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far as (a) is concerned, it is very strenuous to decipher what is meant by the
argument. What is, for instance, meant by ‘asking owners of a wind turbine
to adapt its production to the consumption level’? A wind turbine produces,
when there is wind, which entails that, technically, the adaptation has to be
performed within the systems in which the wind turbines are embedded.
What is meant by (b) then, when the "Political quota-/certificate price mar-
ket" system, by means of the quota, weakens incitements on the crucial mar-
ket for equipment? Concerning (c), it is difficult to understand why the inse-
curity regarding price in the "Feed in--" system is a problem, since it is pos-
sible, as it is currently done in the "Advanced feed in--" system in Germany,
to secure a specific price for electricity from wind turbines built in 2001, and
a new 1.5% lower kWh price for electricity from wind turbines built in 2002,
etc. This provides price security for the investment linked to a given wind
turbine. The argument linked to (d) is interesting, as the electricity law does
state a centrally fixed minimum as well as a maximum price. Furthermore,
the law allows for governmental interference on the market by means of a
governmental purchase of certificates. Consequently, the author of the above
note, so firmly arguing for the "Green Certificate--" model, should find the
present law "meaningless".
The Ministry further discusses the problem of market power in a one-page
note dated January 6th 199943. In this note, there is no serious debate about
the problem, but rather a discussion of how small RE producers’ entering the
market could be secured. This is rather irrelevant, as small RE producers are
already part of "The Danish Wind Turbine Owners’ Energy Co-operative”,
the producers association, and will certainly continue to seek membership in
the future. The power companies are other significant producers and are
owned by 2-5 very large associations of buyers. But these problems are not
at all discussed in the above note. Neither were they discussed anywhere else
before the parliamentary decision was taken.
Before the Parliamentary decision of March 3rd 1999, the Ministry of En-
ergy and Environment’s main avowed reasons for introducing the "Political
quota-/certificate price market" system were:
a. to establish competition between RE producers
b. to participate in the establishment of a European market for Green en-
ergy.
This was combined with a series of arguments stating that the existing "Po-
litical price-/amount market" system had the following problems :
c. it gave excess subsidy to/profits for some wind turbine owners
                                               
43 J.nr.6409-110, Miljø- og Energiministeriet. 67.. januar 1999
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d. the tax funded RE price subsidy was increasing too heavily, due to the
expansion of RE capacity. Therefore, there was a need to remove the
public service payment to RE from the public finance account.
Arguments c. and d. were indeed relevant, and indicated a need to change
the regulation framework. But they did not display a causation link to the
introduction of a "Political quota-/certificate price market" regulation
framework. These arguments could also have been used as the basis for the
introduction of an advanced "Political price-/amount market" system.
B. Viewpoints from other discussion participants before the Parliamentary
decision in March 1999.
Although a usually "green/red" party, the Danish Socialist People’s Party,
finally supported the "Political quota-/certificate price market" model, it is
worth underlining that all the green energy organisations were opposed to
the new model, and lobbied actively against it. Until the Parliamentary
agreement of March 3rd that we described above, there was, although the
time for democratic debate was rather limited, a widespread and articulate
opposition.
The organisation for renewable energy (OVE) was very sceptical about the
"Political quota-./certificate price market" model already back in the Autumn
of 1998, when they decided to suggest the securing a minimum price, which
would make it possible for small investors to invest in RE technologies in
the future (OVE/SEK, undated). So OVE was open for a certificate system,
but wanted price security for investors. Preben Maegård, the head of the
"Peoples Centre for Renewable Energy", wrote a letter in January 1999 to
the chairman of the energy committee in the Danish Parliament, where he
argued against the "Political quota-/certificate price market" system and ad-
vocated a "Political price-/amount market" system (Nordvestjysk Folkecen-
ter for Vedvarende Energi, 1999). I had already written an article in October
1998 pointing out that the certificate market would not function, and that it
would remove the small innovative investors from the investor group
(Hvelplund, 10/1998). In an article in "Ingeniøren", Niels I. Meyer, Profes-
sor at the Danish Technical University (DTU), also warned against the
negative impacts of a "Political quota-/certificate price market" upon the
small innovative investors (Meyer, 1998). On September 4th 1998, Ulrich
Jochimsen and Jann Sørensen from the "Energy and Environment office" in
Flensborg, the border region, wrote an article against the "Political quota-
/certificate price market" system, pointing out that this system was only sup-
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ported by the large utilities, such as PreussenElectra44, and that this system
would damage Danish RE development (Jochimsen and Sørensen, 1998).
The German Chairman of EUROSOLAR, Herman Scheer, a member of the
German Bundestag and the SPD´s45 environment and energy spokesman,
sent a letter to Svend Auken, the Danish Minister of Environment and En-
ergy, where he argued against the introduction of a "Political quota-
/certificate price market" system, and urged Auken to reconsider plans and to
ensure that the "Political price-/amount market" model would remain an op-
tion at the EU level46. In a Conference in Copenhagen, organised by 11
European green organisations47 on October 12th 1998, Herman Scheer ar-
gued for the continuation of a European "Political price-/amount market"
governance model. He said,  "Even if Gerhard Schröder is a friend of
PreussenElectra, he cannot do it. There are many of us who will not accept
it [a change away from the "Feed in—“ regulation], and his small majority
will disappear"48. As the new 2000 German RE law demonstrated, he was
right.
On January 15th 1999, the Danish Association of Wind Turbine Manufac-
turers also warned against the introduction of a "Political quota-/certificate
price market" system, arguing that the market would be too small to function
successfully (Dagbladet Aktuelt, 15/1,1999).
A persistent supporter of the reform was, and still is, the Danish Association
of Electricity companies, DEF, which, from mid-1998, already supported a
"Green Certificate--" reform. See, for instance, (Christoffersen, 1998), using
the Netherlands49 "Green Certificate System-" as an example.
                                               
44 After fusion with VIAG, the name is E.O.N.
45 The German  Social Democratic Party.
46 Letter dated from December 2nd 1998 from Hermann Scheer to Svend Auken. (In
German and also translated into Danish).
47BundesverbandWindEnergie e.V., (BWE), Germany, EUROSOLAR, Förderge-
sellschaftWindenergie, (FGW), Germany, Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie e.V.,
(BEE), Bonn, EUROSUN-Intergroup for members of the European Parliament, The
Association of Wind Turbine Owners, (PAWEX), The Netherlands, The Organisa-
tion for Renewable Energy in Denmark, (OVE), The Danish association of wind
turbine owners, The Danish Ecological Council, and the Society for Green Technol-
ogy, (IDA).
48 "SPD afviser grønt elmarked" Information d. 13 October 1998.
49 This example does not have much to do with the Danish reform, as the Nether-
lands’ "Green Certificate system" has a politically set base RE-electricity price of
around 5,5 EUR/C/kWh, plus a certificate payment amounting to about 2
EUR/C/kWh.
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Conclusion regarding the debate before the Parliamentary decision on
March 3rd 1999.
On the 3rd of March 1999, the Government and a vast majority in the Par-
liament agreed upon the new electricity reform50. This agreement contained
a section on the establishment of a "Political quota-/certificate price market"
governance system for RE. It was a part of the arrangement that, before the
end of 1999, it should be decided how the trade should be organised and how
price fluctuations could be avoided on the marketplace. Furthermore, it was
"assumed" that, in 2003, well functioning market frames would be estab-
lished.
The new electricity law was approved by the Parliament on May 28th 1999.
From all the notes from the Ministry of Environment and Energy, it obvi-
ously transpires that the administration had decided to support the "Political
quota-/certificate pricemarket” model, and that they had had no intention of
comparing this model with any alternative governance framework(s). All the
notes represent "sales" arguments for the "Political quota-/certificate price-
market" model, and there are no arguments to be found which might back
other models.
Furthermore, there was no dialogue in the sense that it was - and still is not
possible to get hold of any consistently worded case for the introduction of
the "Political quota-/certificate price market" model. There was no back-
ground report from the Ministry of Environment and Energy analysing a
"Political quota-/certificate price market" model in a coherent way. There
were just notes on one, two, or maybe three pages with short "five line type"
arguments supporting the "Political quota-/certificate price market" model
without any serious and extensive comparison between alternatives.
So referring to our initial questions, we can conclude that, before  approval
in the Danish Parliament, there was no earnest discussion with regard to al-
ternatives, there was no debate about the risks linked to the introduction of a
"Political quota-/certificate price market" model, there was no far-reaching
and coherent communication, and there was no systematic description of the
theoretical considerations supporting the future reform.
                                               
50 Elreformen. Miljø- og energiministeriet 3. marts. 1999. Aftale mellem
regeringen,Venstre, Det Konservative Folkeparti, Socialistisk Folkeparti og
Kristeligt Folkeparti.
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Thus the decision process displayed all the "symptoms" characteristic of "de-
fective decision making", as they are described in "Groupthink"(Janis,
1982), the book we mentioned earlier on.
9.2.2 The implementation analysis and discussions from August 1999 to
December 1999
As mentioned above, the Parliament also requested further investigations
before the final implementation of the law. Thus these analyses regarding (a)
the technical organisation of a "Political quota-/green certificate price mar-
ket" system, and (b) the establishment of a stable and well-functioning mar-
ket were initiated. A consultancy firm, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC)
analysed mainly the organisation of the market, part (a), and the Ministry of
Energy analysed part (b).
An advisory group of 28 members, representing the administration, energy
companies and a number of social sciences practitioners51 was established.
This group held a series of meetings in September and October 1999.
The meetings were challenging because the administration took it for
granted that the "Political quota-/certificate price market" system should be
implemented following a parliamentary decision. I did maintain, as did other
members of the group, that it was also the objective of the group to voice its
opinion about the function of the market, and that, if we found challenging
problems in the "Political quota-/certificate price market" model indicating
that alternative governance models might be more suitable, we should report
this to the public and to the Ministry. Naturally, the Parliament would then
be able to change its decision, if the administration and the advisory group
suggested new investigations of potential alternatives to be performed.
The advisory group thus submitted a number of comments along with the
PWC September draft report. For instance, Jørn Mikkelsen from ELTRA,
the company responsible for the transmission system in Jutland-Funen,
wrote, "We agree, that the transmission of certificates between countries is
indispensable, if a "Political quota/certificate price market" model is to be
considered meaningful on a longer term base- and therefore meaningful at
all"(Mikkelsen, 1999). This comment from an ELTRA representative is in-
teresting, especially since Germany and France have introduced a sequel of
the "Political price-/amount market" model, and since the European court
has deemed the German "Political price-" model acceptable.
                                               
51 A group that I was a member of.
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DEF, The Danish association of Energy Companies (mainly electricity com-
panies) found the draft report satisfactory, and emphasised the fact that the
advisory group should not discuss the pros and cons of the "Political quota-
/certificate price market" model, as this model had been "approved by the
Parliament".  The question then revolved around the implementation of the
new law, and not around whether it should actually be carried through.
Søren Krohn, from the Danish association of wind turbine producers, was
very critical towards the conclusions of the above-mentioned draft report,
and underlined, that a "Political quota-/certificate price market" model could
not work on an isolated Danish market. Moreover, he pointed out that the
recommendations in the report, section 9.5.4., mainly supported the interests
of the DEF. PWC, for instance, suggested that the wind turbines owned by
power companies, and already paid up by electricity consumers, should also
obtain "Green certificates" for their production. Furthermore, he expressed
difficulties in understanding how a system, where a few electricity distribu-
tion companies bought Green certificates from their own two power compa-
nies, could be a sound basis for a well-functioning market (Krohn, 1999).
Confronted with this type of critique at a meeting with the advisory com-
mittee, PWC stated that the conclusion, on page 93 in the draft report, was
copied word for word from a DEF paper52, and was sent for comments,
without any references, to the members of the advisory group. Additionally,
it was made clear, that in the background research, PWC had mainly inter-
viewed DEF members. This naturally resulted in a very tough discussion
during the following meeting of the advisory group. On page 62 of the above
draft report, PWC also declared that the risk of market dominance by the
buyers-/distribution companies would probably be lower than the risk from
the producer side. I countered this statement by mentioning that the buy-
ers/distribution companies owned the largest RE electricity supplier, i.e. the
power companies, and that they consequently were in an extremely good
position as far as market power was concerned.
Marianne Bender, the chairperson of OVE, the Danish association for re-
newable energy, underlined in her critique (Annex 3 October meeting of the
advisory group)53, as others also did it, that it would be essential to replace
                                               
52 The paper is published in (DEF Oct. 1999) J. nr. 413-02-01."Prisdannelsen på VE-
bevismarkedet."
53 Annex 3. Skriftlige kommentarer til PriceWaterhouseCoopers rapportudkast om
VE-marked. Distributed at the meeting with the advisory group on September 21st
1998.
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PWC with a impartial consultancy firm, without client interests54. In the
same Annex, Flemming Tranæs, from the association of Danish Wind Tur-
bine Owners, was very critical of the report, and found it unacceptable that
the power companies should obtain certificates, as this would represent a
double subsidy for these companies. Furthermore, he pointed out that it was
not satisfactory that PWC had only interviewed members of DEF and the
central administration. He mentioned that it looked as if DEF had written the
report. Later, as mentioned above, it was admitted that DEF had written the
final conclusion and recommendations on page 93 in the draft report.
The final PWC report was submitted in October 1998 and, amongst others,
raised the following comments;
Søren Krohn from the association of wind turbine producers concluded that
neither PWC nor the Energy administration were even close to having suffi-
ciently analysed a future market for RE certificates. He also concluded that
during the work in the advisory committee and upon examining PWC´s
work, it had become increasingly doubtful whether the implementation of a
RE-certificate market was a good idea at all. He regarded the "Political
quota-/certificate price market" model as being the most complicated and
inefficient, when comparing it with either a "Political price-/amount market"
model or an auction type model like the one contemporarily practised in the
U.K. He also found it unacceptable that power companies would be getting
certificates for wind turbines that consumers had already paid via the elec-
tricity price. A main statement in his critique is to be found on page 14: "The
notorious waste caused by the fact, that the contemplated RE-certificate
system in general has not at all been analysed from a societal point of view
in order to find the cheapest way of implementing renewable energy, proba-
bly is quite considerable"(Krohn, 1999).
Hans- Erik Kristoffersen from DEF55 found the PWC report satisfactory, and
furthermore commented on a short paper from the Energy administration,
"Price formation on a RE certificate market". He did not believe that the
problem with market power discussed in that paper would be serious: "It
does not seem plausible, that a single company could achieve so much mar-
ket power, that the strategic game shown in the paper could be realised. On
a long-term basis, new actors will enter the market. The establishment of a
larger European market for certificates will also reduce the possibility of
exploiting a potentially dominant position. Furthermore, competition
                                               
54 PWC does consultancy jobs for members of the DEF.
55 Kommentarer til PWC rapport og Energistyrelsens udkast til notat om prisdannel-
sen på VE-bevismarkedet.
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authorities will keep an eye upon the development on the market" (Kristof-
fersen, 1999).
DEF, which is the central organisation for the Danish Power and Electricity
Distribution Companies, consequently did not believe in the problematic
nature of the following dimension, i.e. the fact that large buyers’ associations
formed by the distribution companies would own the largest suppliers of
certificates on the market, the two large power plant companies. It is worth
remarking though, that DEF found the establishment of a European Certifi-
cate market essential for the well functioning of the internal market, a pre-
condition that, with the present development in Germany, France and the
European Union, does not seem to be under way.
Marianne Bender from the Danish Association for Renewable Energy (OVE)
pointed out56 that the coming "Political quota-/certificate price market"
model was tailored for large RE suppliers, such as the current power compa-
nies, and the large buyers associations amongst the distribution companies.
She also underlined that, with heavily fluctuating prices, small investors
would not be able to survive periods of low prices, whereas large investors
would have the capital background and/or governmental financial support
enabling them to survive these periods. Thus, the system would imply con-
centration on the investor side. She, furthermore, mentioned that it had so far
not been illustrated how a "Political quota-/certificate price market" system
would entail increased competition, when compared with a "Political price-
/amount market" system. She concluded by " warning against the establish-
ment of a "Green Certificate--" market, without it being sufficiently analysed
and without having examined its consequences thoroughly".
9.2.3 Conclusion regarding the symptoms of the discourse and decision
process
A campaign without dialogue
In the phase from mid 1998 to March 1999, when the decision was taken in
Parliament to approve a new electricity law containing the implementation
of a "Political quota-/certificate price market" system, the debate showed the
following characteristics:
- There was no systematic analysis behind the introduction of a "Political
quota-/certificate price market" system. The administration submitted
several one to three-page papers, where the advantages of a "Political
quota-/certificate price  market" system were described. These notes dis-
                                               
56 Kommentarer vedr.notat(udkast):"Prisdannelse på et marked for VE-beviser", 16
November 1999.
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played no depth whatsoever in their analysis/description, and it still im-
possible to find any paper from the administration which explains in
what way a "Political quota-/certificate price market" system could pro-
vide more competition and "value for the money", than a "Political
price-/amount market" system.
- The administration’s strategy was one of extensively stolid and insensi-
tive openness. "Notes" and small papers were publicly accessible on the
Internet. Furthermore, there were hearings, and people from the admini-
stration participated in several seminars up until the March decision.
Meanwhile, the main problem was that obviously, the Ministry was en-
tering the discussion with a "closed mind". In its notes regarding the fu-
ture RE governance system, it just advocated the "Green Certificate--"
model, not at all discussing whether it was/is a valid model or not. Obvi-
ously, there is no problem with "advocating" something if there is a con-
sistent, systematic and open analysis behind the argument. In that case, it
is possible to analyse the assumptions and enter a well-founded discus-
sion. But when there are only "sales arguments" and no systematic
analysis of what lies behind these arguments, fruitful dialogue becomes
very difficult.
The administration perhaps heard but certainly did not listen. Cam-
paigning had replaced fruitful dialogue.
In the implementation phase after the March 1999 decision, the policy of
openness continued, and a very broad advisory group representing many dif-
ferent interests and viewpoints worked during the Autumn of 1999. This pe-
riod could be characterised by the following:
- The agenda was limited, as it was not accepted to discuss the basic deci-
sion underlying the introduction of a "Political quota-/certificate price
market" system. The Parliament had decided in the new law that such a
system should be introduced and the question then, was how to imple-
ment this system. The situation in the advisory group was very awkward,
as the discussion often ended up with basic arguments against the intro-
duction of this system. But these arguments were necessarily outside the
agenda.
- Several basic arguments against the "Political quota-/cerficate price
market" system were put forward by different groups and individuals,
but there was no Ministerial reaction towards these arguments.
- PriceWaterhouseCoopers, the consultant firm, mainly interviewed mem-
bers of a single interest group, namely the association of power produc-
ers and power distributors, DEF, which was very much in favour of the
"Green Certificate--" system. This interest group also bought consul-
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tancy services from PWC, so PWC was not an economically neutral and
independent investigator.
The general situation, then, was such that, before the parliamentary decision
in March, no systematic analyses were performed. After the decision was
made by the Parliament, it was no longer on the agenda to question it, as it
had already been finalised.
Inability to reappraise initially rejected alternatives
The analysis after the parliamentary approval in March 1999 was not able to
include this reappraisal, despite suggestions from various members of the
advisory group. One of the advisors, J. Birk Mortensen, a member of the
Danish Economical Council, was very sceptical regarding the functioning of
the certificate price market and suggested a system with a fixed certificate
price, in order to avoid the monopoly problems inherent to the Certificate
market (Mortensen, 1999).
It was clear from the discussion before the decision, that the main arguments
for the introduction of a "Political quota-/certificate price market" system
was:
- To establish competition between RE producers.
This was emphasised at a seminar on September 7, 1998 by Svend Au-
ken, the Minister of Energy, with statements such as: "A well-
functioning green market implies many actors and market transpar-
ency"57.
- To participate in an open European RE-electricity market.
During the same seminar, the Minister of Energy stated: "The Certificate
market provides better opportunities to sell Danish RE-electricity on the
international market". This was underpinned by arguments from the
administration, painting a picture of  development in Europe, where the
EU commission and most other countries would also introduce a "Green
Certificate--" system.
As Annex 2 (in Report on "Political quota-/cerficate price market") illus-
trates, it no longer is the assumption of the Ministry that the market will con-
sist of many small RE-suppliers (Energistyrelsen, 1999). Furthermore, inter-
national development in 2000 and 2001 has shown, as described in Chapter
5, that the situation did not evolve, as it was assumed it would in the prem-
ises behind the Parliamentary decision of March 1999.
                                               
57 Speech given by the Minister of Energy, Svend Auken, at an IDA conference re-
garding the electricity reform, Sept. 7th, 1998.
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It is worthwhile to emphasise that the above-mentioned two main assump-
tions behind the March 1999 decision have changed fundamentally since
that decision. So far, there have been no signs heralding a change of deci-
sion in accordance with the changed assumptions. The goal remains to im-
plement the "Political quota-/certificate price market" system from around
2003.
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The symptoms with regard to the decision making process are summarised in
Table 5.
a. Discussion of
alternatives
The administration never seemed to want to pursue a
serious discussion of alternatives.
b. Survey of ob-
jectives/ goals
The original goal was to reach 20% RE-based electric-
ity in 2000, but there were no objectives with regard to
the organisational method of achieving this goal.
c. Analysis of
risks
There was no analysis of the obvious risks linked to
changing governance systems.
d. Ability to
reappraise ini-
tially rejected al-
ternatives.
Hardly any  ability or willingness to change courses:
neither as a response to changed premises, nor as a
reaction to arguments emanating from individuals and
groups sceptical about the "Political quota-/certificate
price market" model.
e. Quality of in-
formation re-
search
There was no systematic analysis of whether there
would be many actors on the future market and whether
it would be well functioning.
f. Bias in proc-
essing the infor-
mation at hand
From mid 1998, there was a clear bias in favour of the
"Political quota-/certificate price market"  model.
g. Consciousness
regarding para-
digm
There has not been any systematic discussion concern-
ing the theoretical paradigm behind the "Political
quota-/certificate price market" model.
h. Contingency
plans
No plans established, which means that the changed
premises from 2000 and 2001 basically do not influ-
ence the reform.
h. Democratic
process and
quality of dia-
logue.
There was an exceptional openness and apparent will-
ingness to enter into a “dialogue" with the public. In
practice however, there was generally no reaction to
opposing viewpoints raised by green organisations or
individuals. Neither was there any systematic and
documented rejection of the arguments. Thus, there was
a state of willingness to hear and argue, but not to lis-
ten in an open-ended dialogue.
Table 5. Symptoms of defective decision-making.
That there was something the matter with the discourse is clear, with symp-
toms of disease at almost all levels. At the same time, a legitimate self-
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defence argument from the viewpoint of the administration would be to em-
phasise that there was open access to information, with ministerial notes and
answers to questions from Parliamentarians posted on the Internet, there was
a number of publicly available consultancy reports, that Ministry employees
participated in several seminars and conferences up to the final decision, etc.
A vast majority in Parliament then agreed to approve the new electricity law,
including the establishment of a "Political quota-/certificate price market"
system. Furthermore, after the decision was taken, in the Autumn of 1999, a
very broad advisory group was set up, representing power companies, the
wind power industry, various energy companies, industry in general, grass-
roots organisations, universities, etc. The administration could almost claim
that it was a textbook example in administrative openness and democracy
ending up with a massive approval in Parliament.
Despite time constraints and the use of economically dependent consultancy
firms, the decision process certainly was open and democratic from late
August 1998 and onwards. It is understandable why some would describe
the process as close to the best praxis. That is one of the causes making it
especially interesting to try to understand why the decision process, never-
theless, showed almost every sign of defective decision-making.
9.3 Symptoms of groupthink
We have no evidence of- nor belief in the fact that the administration of the
Ministry might have had any "illusion of invulnerability" or a "belief in the
inherent morality of the group". Therefore, "overestimation of the group"
probably was not a dominant characteristic of the group dealing with these
questions in the Ministry61.
Regarding "Closed-mindedness", type II in the groupthink symptoms, it
seems clear that from August 1998, when the first proposal concerning a
"Political quota-/certificate price market" system was published, there was
no serious willingness in the Ministry of Energy and Environment to dis-
cuss alternatives to this model. This "Political quota-/certificate price mar-
ket" model was considered necessary because of EU requirements,. It was
also considered liberalistic and "modern" and the up and coming way of or-
ganising the RE-electricity governance framework not just in Denmark, but
in all of Europe.
                                               
61 Figure 11, type I "Groupthink symptom".
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A classical symptom of groupthink is a "stereotyping of out-groups", which
probably did develop within the Ministry. On several occasions it was rather
obvious that people arguing against the "Political quota-/certificate price
market" system and for the "Political price-/amount market" model were
considered to be out of real contact with the market realities of today’s
world. This "Political price-/amount market" model was an outdated "non-
alternative", which was promoted by groups that had not noticed the new
developments in history, groups whose economic interest resided in a con-
tinuation of “too favourable” prices for RE-electricity. These groups, fur-
thermore, had not yet noticed that the times when development could be
driven by "twelve idealistic schoolteachers58" were gone, and that it was time
for "market" and "big capital".
As far as "mono-paradigm" behaviour is concerned, the Ministry did not
construct any fundamental analysis aimed at circumscribing their general
paradigmatic stand. There was no systematic discussion of the premises be-
hind the advocating of a "Political quota-/certificate price market" system.
There never seemed to be any space for the little boy in "The Emperor’s new
clothes" to say that there was at best no more "liberalisation" or "free mar-
ket" in the "Political quota-/certificate price market" model than in the "Po-
litical price-/amount market" model. In the publications from the Ministry,
there is no analysis of the specific character of the technological change in
question. Neither is there any comparative discussion of the various political
effects entailed by the two governance frameworks. In general, there just
seems to be a relatively "vague" model representation behind the decision,
namely a sort of neo-classical understanding of economy. But even this un-
derstanding is never precisely described.
Regarding "in group" pressures towards uniformity, the question has not
been analysed in any depth here. Outwardly, the Ministry always showed
unanimity, which naturally does not prove that this perceived unanimity al-
ways existed. Maybe the relatively closed Ministerial "Electricity reform
Group", which functioned from 1996 to 1998, had comprehensive discus-
sions, including disagreements.
But we do know that, if this was the case, these discussions were never re-
flected in the public arena or amongst the Parliamentarians making the final
decision in March 1999. The public and the Parliamentarians were faced
with a non-choice, namely one institutional solution: the "Political quota-
/certificate price market" model.
                                               
58 See footnote 41.
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9.4 Antecedent conditions influencing the decision making
process
We have not examined whether the "decision-maker" group in the Ministry
constitutes a cohesive group with negative59 "groupthink" tendencies. By
means of reading the documents from the Ministry, some "structural faults"
in the way the Ministry is working can be localised.
- No alternatives were systematically listed, and neither was pro ET contra
systematically discussed. There is no background material from the Ministry
with this type of systematic analysis. If this is the traditional way of analys-
ing this type of important questions, it can be described as a "structural fault"
within the Ministry.
- One cannot maintain that the Ministry insulated itself after the first ministe-
rial paper describing the "Political quota-/certificate price market" model
was "published" in August/September 1999. From this point of time, the
Ministry displayed extensive openness of information, and participated in
conferences and seminars dealing with the subject. But the Ministry was
very closed before that time, and had established a rather insulated group,
"the electricity reform group", which held meetings for invited experts and
interest groups, but had no systematic public discussion of different RE-
electricity governance models.
This would indicate, that the reference group communicating with the Min-
istry in this phase mainly belonged to the external group "economically de-
pendent" lobbyists, mainly people from the established electricity sector.
-Regarding communication with external groups, the employment of the
consultancy firm, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC), as investigator of im-
portant questions regarding the implementation phase, can be regarded as a
structural mistake60, as PWC was not economically independent61 of one im-
portant interest group participating in the discussion, namely the electricity
companies. PWC collected information almost exclusively from electricity
                                               
59 By this is meant tendencies, which further the mentioned sympthoms of defective
decision making in Figure 11.
60 We call it a "structural mistake", as it is linked to a part of the normal behaviour in
the Ministry to employ consultancy firms without seriously analysing their degree of
economic independence. I mentioned the problem on several occasions in the "advi-
sory group" without any reaction from the Ministry of energy employees.
61 These companies are on different occasions PWC customers.
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sector actors62. In the Autumn of 1998 they had 24 meetings with electricity
sector people, and one meeting with a representative for the wind turbine
industry and one meeting with a representative for the association of Danish
wind turbine owners. PWC had no meetings with the Danish Association for
Renewable Energy, OVE. Regarding used literature, PWC mentions eight
papers from the Danish electricity companies, one critical paper from the
association of Danish wind turbine producers, and no further critical papers
or articles, although several existed at that time. Due to its performance in
practice with a very biased information collection process, the use of PWC
proved to be very problematic. This was foreseeable, as PWC has their cul-
tural and economical relationship to the electricity sector, which on different
occasions, are PWC customers. The ones not listened to, for example, the
organisation for renewable energy (OVE) have no intentions of -nor money
to use PWC as consultant. In general, it is a structural fault to use a consult-
ant who can be accused of not being economically independent with regard
to the questions examined, and the actors interested in the outcome of the
examination.
-It should here be underlined, that when Janis, in "Groupthink", talks about
insulation of the decision group, he talks about a physical group linked to a
specific organisation. In this case it would be the decision-makers in the
Ministry of Environment and Energy. Here we talk about an insulation proc-
ess with regard to an analytical paradigm, economical interests and view-
points. The latter type of insulation process was very present in the period
before mid 1998, where the decision in reality was taken. In this period there
were close links to the viewpoints of the economically dependent, and weak
connections with the economically independent lobbyists.
The discussion in Autumn 1998 and the Spring 1999 were to be considered
as pseudo-democratic discussions, where the Ministry defended and advo-
cated the model which they had decided upon before the democratic discus-
sion started in the Autumn 1998, and where the Danish Association of Elec-
tricity companies, DEF, supported the Ministry all the way through this dis-
cussion.
Regarding "lack of norms requiring methodological procedures", which
secures that alternatives are systematically evaluated, it is evident that the
performance of the Ministry, in this case, reveals a clear lack of such pro-
cedures.
                                               
62 See annex 8 page 77 and annex 9 page 79 in ,"Organisering af VE-marked og
handel med VE-beviser", PWC October 1999.
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9.5 What made the decision process defective?
As summarised in Table 5, the decision process after mid 1998 had almost
all the symptoms of a defective decision process. This included no serious
discussion of alternatives, no risk analysis nor contingency plans, poor and
biased information research, weak ability in reappraising the decision, no
open ended discussion with opponents and no ability nor willingness to dis-
cuss the theoretical paradigm behind the "Political quota-/certificate price
market" model. But how could a decision process end up with so many
symptoms of defectiveness?
One level of explanation could be that an almost final decision seems to have
been made before mid 1998, when the public was shown the concrete plans
for the establishment of a "Political quota-/certificate price market" model.
So the period after mid 1998 was not the real decision process, but a process
of selling a decision, which in reality was made before mid 1998.
This explanation makes sense, when trying to explain why the administration
was very insensitive to arguments opposing the "Political quota-/certificate
price market" model from the very beginning of the public debate in the
Autumn of 1998.
So the decision process might be described as having three phases:
a. The real decision63, before the public debate started in Autumn 1998,
mainly made within the Ministry within the "Electricity reform group" in
collaboration with representatives from the electricity sector.
b. A pseudo-decision process from Autumn 1998 to March 1999, when a
majority in the Parliament agreed upon the "Political quota-/certificate
price market" model.
c. An "implementation preparation" process, where a wide number of peo-
ple from different organisations and with different interest were partici-
pating in discussions which were not supposed to deal with the question
"whether to implement"-, but only the question "how to implement" a
"Green Certificate-/quota market system.
In this case, the openness in phase (b) and (c) could be regarded as just a part
of a legitimisation process designed to confirm the initial decision in phase
(a). This type of conclusion also explains why the administration did not at
                                               
63 It is somehow difficult to catch what a decision in fact is. Most likely, there has
just developed a common understanding of the problem in the "Electricity reform
group" representing a "de facto" decision
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all react to the very extensive critique which was put forward, also during
the Autumn 1999 implementation preparation phase. It is difficult to find
any other explanation for this willingness to hear, but not to listen and react,
nor enter any deep dialogue with the opponents.
It should be underlined that the Ministry was very efficient in the sense that
it had the ability to sell the idea of the "Political quota-/certificate price mar-
ket" model to the Parliamentarians.  The only remaining "problem" seen
from the viewpoint of the Ministry is that an unexpected reality has "come to
town" destroying the premises of the original decision:
- The Ministry did not realise that the European development did not de-
velop, as assumed in the premises behind the decision. Neither the EU
Commission, the EU Court, Germany nor France behaved as expected in the
premises, and the "Political quota-/certificate price market" model has not
become the "one and only" RE-electricity governance model for Europe.
- The "Political price-/amount market" model has survived in Europe for at
least 5-10 years, and might probably become an important inspiration for a
coming European RE-electricity governance framework.
- This means that for at least five years from now on, and probably more
years to come, there will be no common market for RE-electricity in EU.
Consequently, the Danish model will be limited to Denmark and maybe the
rest of Scandinavia. But Scandinavia is not really interesting for Denmark, as
the quantity of new renewable energy sources is very limited, and competi-
tion with Scandinavian hydro power is impossible for the Danish wind tur-
bines and biomass plants.
- The Ministry premise of many suppliers of RE-electricity does not seem to
be realised, and a coming Certificate market will not have sufficient suppli-
ers and buyers. Consequently it cannot be well functioning, as assumed be-
fore the decision in 1999.
Now there is a need for changing the original decision, but has the Ministry
the ability to change this decision? In order to analyse this, it is worthwhile
to shortly summarise the groupthink symptoms and antecedent conditions
that might have caused the defective decision making discussed here. Table
6 summarises the main problems in the Ministry leading to the above symp-
toms of a defective decision making process.
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"Closed-
mindedness"
Yes.
-No opposing viewpoints were included after the start
of the public debate in August 1998.
- No discussion regarding the general paradigm
linked to the introduction of a "Green Certificate-
/quota market system".
- No systematic listing of the premise behind the
introduction of a "Green Certificate--" model.
"Stereotyping out-
groups"
Probably yes. It was a clear impression in an array of
seminars and conferences that the opponents of this
new "Certificate---" model were "out of date" pro-
moting a "Feed in model", which could not be real-
ised in EU-Europe.
"Mono-paradigm"
behaviour.
Yes
-No ability to look thoroughly into their own prem-
ises, nor trying to include sociological and political
viewpoints on the RE-electricity development proc-
ess.
"Insulated decision
group"
Yes. Until mid 1998, the electricity reform group
held meetings and discussions outside the public
sphere, though in relatively close contact with repre-
sentatives for the well-established electricity sector.
External connec-
tions
1. Biased connec-
tions to external
groups.
2. Lack of con-
sciousness regarding
economic interests
of external groups.
Yes
- Biased connections in the phase before mid 1998.
- Biased connections via the use of PriceWater-
houseCoopers.
- No serious communication with opponents to the
"Green Certificate--" model.
"Lack of norms re-
quiring methodo-
logical procedures".
Yes. No paper from the Ministry showed a system-
atic comparison of alternative RE-electricity govern-
ance frameworks.
Table 6. Summary regarding Symptoms of Groupthink and antecedent con-
ditions.
It is naturally worthwhile to pose the question: Why did the Ministry act in
the above way. Was it because of bad organisation, or was it a sort of
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"structural manipulation". Was it a way of taking the "risk out of democ-
racy"64? The Ministry was very successful regarding selling "their own"
governance framework to the Parliament. This was done by the "Ministerial
system", which, on purpose or not in tune with reality, took the risk out of a
democracy which indeed was risky, due to the extensive openness of infor-
mation and willingness to engage in public discussions. The Ministry itself
had created a considerable "democratic risk" by supporting openness and
some participation. In reality, it also dismantled this risk by acting as fol-
lows:
Firstly the decision probably was, in one way or another, made within the
Ministry before the public debate started in August 1998.
Secondly this debate was not supplied with any systematic material making
it possible to discuss alternative governance systems. So there was only one
institutional solution to choose from.
Thirdly, without any developed alternatives, the decision period from Sep-
tember 1998 until around February 1999 was much too short, when dealing
with such complicated questions.
A bit harshly, one could say, the Ministry was extremely efficient in making
a bad decision, and doing it against the opposition of all the green groups,
the wind turbine industry, and the association of Wind Turbine owners in an
environment with a high level of openness and public participation. Fur-
thermore, the taken decision favoured the traditional electricity sector, which
got exactly the governance model they wanted.
9.6 Conclusion
The initial question in this chapter was: "How should the political system be
designed in order to be able to handle "radical technological changes". The
described decision process has some good elements linked to a high level of
willingness and tradition for openness of information and public participa-
tion in seminars, conferences, etc. The paradox, though, is that despite this
high level of "democracy" the economically independent lobbyists were to-
tally outdone in this "first half" of a not yet ended battle regarding the Dan-
ish and EU governance framework for RE-electricity. This "first half" of
defeat for the economically independent lobbyists (energy grassroots groups)
                                               
64 See "Taking the risk out of democracy" Alex Carey 1995.  Illini Books edition,
1997.
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represents almost a tradition, and has occurred on several occasions in the
last 25 years of Danish energy history. This tradition of losing the "first half"
probably is caused by a longer distance from the administration to these
groups, than from the administration to the economically dependent lobby-
ists, the electricity companies, which often enter the decision process at an
early stage. The "second half" will probably be performed in the next couple
of years until around 2004, where the "Green Certificate -/quota market"
model will move from ideology to reality. In this period, it is very valuable
that the Ministry has a tradition for openness of information.
Nevertheless, it is a rather costly experience to start up with a non-
functioning model, and it is worthwhile to try to learn from the experiences
within this decision process.
How should the decision process have been designed?
We cannot give an exhaustive answer here, but only convey some sugges-
tions, based upon the (some would say naive65) assumption, that the Ministry
wants an improved and more democratic decision process.
1. The decision should never be made in closed Ministerial "inside groups"
communicating mainly with the electricity companies.
2. A procedure should be established where alternatives are put forward
and pro ET contra thoroughly discussed.
This discussion should be open and encompass viewpoints from a broad
spectrum of interest groups. The Ministry should allocate funds to grassroots
groups in order to enable them to buy independent consultancy assistance.
This should be in order to solve the big problem that the electricity organisa-
tion has full time people employed on the subject, paid by the electricity
consumers, whereas the grassroots groups often have limited time and finan-
cial capacity.
3. Consultancy firms employed by the Ministry should always be economi-
cally independent of the large actors within the energy scene. If this is
                                               
65 It naturally might be a Ministerial tactic to act as in this case, in order to get the
decision passed in the Parliament without problems from the green organisations.
The only problem is that reality "comes to town" and, in this case, with a totally dif-
ferent appearance than the premises behind the decision. The administration then
sees huge problems linked to the difference between reality and the governance
framework being implemented.
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not possible, it should be secured that "counter expertise" is employed in
order to supply "second opinions".
4. In general, answers from the Ministry on questions from, for instance,
members of the Parliament, should have a much higher quality than in
this case. Sufficient resources and a system to secure specific quality
demands that ministerial answers have to be developed. This is probably
a resource question. If it is a resource question, it should be kept in mind
that this type of decisions could have economic consequences amounting
to billions of ECU66.
                                               
66 In the year 2000, the export of Danish wind-turbines amounted to more than 1
billion ECU, and the production to the home market constituted more than 0.5 Bil-
lion ECU. So gambling with this industry might show up to be a very costly busi-
ness.
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10. Conclusion/executive summary
This publication includes, as described in Chapter 1, Figure 1, an analysis
regarding which RE-electricity governance framework should be chosen on
a global basis, both in Europe and in Denmark, and how the political system
should be designed in order to handle technological change that encounters
strong resistance from established energy companies on the market.
We thus analyse both the RE-electricity institutional framework ("first or-
der" institutional framework), and the political system that designs and gov-
erns this framework ("second order” institutional framework). This ‘double
purpose’ is motivated by the current situation of change, which is character-
ised by a crucial shift away from techno-organisational structures linked to
fossil fuels and uranium, to new and relatively weak (politically and finan-
cially speaking) techno-organisations linked to energy conservation and the
use of RE resources. This change often implies a decrease in the market
share of financially and politically well established fossil fuel based compa-
nies. A fact that often results in a win/lose situation (seen from the viewpoint
of these companies) is that, compared to the previous situation, they mostly
do not possess any competitive comparative advantages when it comes to the
development and implementation of the new green energy technologies. In
many cases, in fact, they are even disadvantaged, due to their stranded hard-
ware and software costs. Therefore, developing and implementing new tech-
nologies within such companies mostly has to compete with the short-term
marginal costs of fossil fuel techniques.
This condition has been enforced, especially since these companies have, in
recent years, and especially in Europe, consistently shown excess capacity.
In the current situation, the Parliament has an important role to play, as the
institution supporting the innovation and implementation of the new green
technologies that are considered ‘innovation risks’ by fossil fuel and ura-
nium based companies. The Parliament is therefore tested in the sense that it
will be revealed whether the Government is able to act independently of
large and influential economic-, political- and ideological pressure groups,
which are often represented by the large fossil fuel and uranium based com-
panies.67 Is the Government, in this current situation of change, sufficiently
independent from vested interests to be able to support the innovation, de-
                                               
67 The new American Bush Government is an example of a government that does
not have the economical independence needed to further a technological innovation
process on the energy scene.
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velopment and implementation of the new energy conservation and RE tech-
nologies? This undoubtedly is one of the most important contemporary
questions. Recent developments under the new American Presidency have
very clearly shown that this type of independence does not presently exist in
the USA. Obviously, neither the EU nor Denmark can boast a clear-cut in-
dependent situation, but at least the balance of power in the EU and Den-
mark, between economically dependent and independent lobbyists, does not
seem to systematically favour only the vested interests of fossil fuel and ura-
nium consortiums.
10.1 Comparison of two RE-electricity governance frame-
works (“first order” institutions)
Two main public regulation frameworks for RE were examined:
- The "Political price-/amount market" model, with politically decided
prices on RE electricity, and with the produced quantity of RE determined
by the market: This model has been used with great success in Denmark,
Germany and Spain, where around 80% of the EU wind power has been im-
plemented so far. Since the 1999 Danish electricity law, Denmark has left
this model, but in 2001 the French Parliament  decided to introduce a "Po-
litical price-/amount market" model for France. There are a number of dif-
ferent "Political price-/amount market" model versions, but the one analysed
in detail here is the new German, advanced "Political price-/amount market"
model, with a price differentiation for RE electricity according to the local
RE resource base.
- The "Political quota-/certificate price market" model, with politically
decided quantities of RE (quotas) and prices of certificates are defined on a
certificate market. A version of this model has so far been used in the Neth-
erlands for a couple of years. There are also various certificate model ver-
sions. The one we have extensively analysed here was approved by the Dan-
ish Parliament in the spring of 1999, and will probably be implemented
around 2003.
So the basic comparison in this publication is between the new German
advanced "Political price-/amount market" model, and the new Danish
"Political quota-/certificate price market" model.
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The basic aim of this comparison has been to find out which model yields
the best goal performance with regard to RE price and costs, technological
innovation, and democracy.
The analytical approach in this publication is motivated by an understanding
of the problems related to RE implementation, an understanding which em-
phasises that there are four special characteristics which should be taken
into consideration when establishing a framework for the implementation of
RE technologies.
Firstly, it is important to be aware that RE technologies differ from fossil
fuel technologies with regard to their resource base. Fossil fuel technologies
such as coal-fired power plants can basically buy coal at the same world
market price in all of Europe. The economy of coal-fired power plants is,
therefore, mainly dependent upon the management efficiency of these plants.
RE technologies such as wind-, biomass -, wave- and solar energy have a
resource base that varies from place to place. Production using these tech-
nologies is thus dependent upon both management efficiency and the local
resource base. There is no world market where one can buy wind energy and
then “burn it” where one wants to. This contrast between fossil fuel- and RE
technologies makes a great difference in the demands one should place upon
the public regulation frameworks.
Secondly, RE technologies such as wind turbines, photovoltaics, and wave
power systems are, due to the avoidance of commercial fuels, characterised
by around 80% of their total life-time costs built into the initial investment
costs. They can be considered as a sort of energy automaton. This feature
should be seen in relation to fossil fuel power plants, which usually have
only around 40- 50% of costs linked to the initial investment, the rest of the
costs being labour and fuel costs. This characteristic of RE technologies re-
sults in a specific market behaviour, as almost all costs, once the initial in-
vestment has been made, can be regarded as “stranded costs”. Investing in
RE technologies, therefore, is an even more risky activity than investing in
fossil fuel technologies. This has many implications for market development,
especially with regard to the development of market power institutions, such
as mergers and strategic alliances between power producers as well as power
distributors, which infiltrate (capture) public regulation authorities and poli-
ticians by heavy lobbying activities and ‘buy’ public opinion by means of
propaganda in the media, and by sponsoring research projects.
Thirdly, RE technologies are characterised by being linked to the sites where
the RE source is located. In the case of wind energy, the need to use inland
sites implies that wind turbines often have to be built in populated areas.
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This factor often stimulates local resistance, due to visual and noise incon-
venience from the wind turbines. One of the best ways to counteract this ef-
fect is to provide compensation to wind turbine neighbours by making it a
legal obligation that they should have the right to a certain amount of shares
in the wind turbine.
Fourthly, RE-technologies are newcomers having minor market shares, and
meeting resistance strategies from established fossil fuel and uranium
techno/organisations.
As a consequence of the above perspective on the problem, our investigation
began with a short description of the general methodology and theoretical
framework (Chapter 1 and 2). Then the two RE governance models were
described in combination with an illumination of some ideological delusions
in the discourse (Chapter 3 and 4). In Chapter 5 we analysed the  EU state of
affairs with regard to RE regulation. Then we went on to investigating the
adaptability of the two models to various RE resource bases (Chapters 6 and
7). In Chapter 8 we discussed the need for a new renewable energy regula-
tion infrastructure. Finally we analysed the decision process behind the in-
troduction of a Danish "Political quota-/certificate price market" regulation
system (Chapter 9).
Which type of model introduces the best type of competition?
First of all, it is important to point out that we cannot back the assertion of
advocates of the “Political quota-/certificate price market" models, who of-
ten claim that the latter are more “free market” than the "Political price-
/amount market" models. In the "Political quota-/certificate price market"
model, politicians determine the RE quantity (quota), and the price is
(partly)68 defined on the market. In the "Political price-/amount market"
model, politicians determine the price, and the quantity is fixed on a market.
Which model is ‘most market oriented’ is thus impossible to derive from
abstract discussions.
After taking a closer look at market reality with the analysis in Chapter 7, it
was concluded that:
- the “Political quota-/certificate price market" model ends up introducing
price competition (between energy automatons) on a dwindling market, and
abolishing market competition on an expanding market for energy equip-
                                               
68 In Denmark the politicians define a minimum and a maximum price for RE cer-
tificates.
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ment. This is due to the fact that RE technologies are often energy automa-
tons, with around 80% of total costs built into the initial investment. Once
windmills have been erected on their final site, it is impossible to cut down
on their costs. The only stage during which the costs of wind turbines can be
compressed is in the factories where the energy automatons are produced.
But in the "Political quota-/certificate price market" model this market for
equipment is weakened because the politically determined quotas make it
impossible for the wind turbine branch to increase sales by lowering wind
turbine production prices.
- the “advanced “Political price-/amount market” model would increase
competition on the expanding market for equipment, and is, therefore, espe-
cially well suited to a period of transition to RE technologies, which can be
considered as energy automatons.
Which type of competition will develop on a "Political quota-/certificate
price market"?
It is interesting to observe that, so far, there has been no analysis of this
question in the Danish decision process leading up to the approval of the
new Danish electricity law in 1999. Instead of analysing potential market
outcomes, given the specific nature of this market, the main analytical efforts
have been concentrated on the analysis of a number of bureaucratic techni-
calities linked to the “advent” of a market for Green Certificates. Questions
have included: how can we keep track of the certificates? For how long
Conclusion 1. The "Political price-/amount market" model (2000 Ger-
man type) represents more market competition than the "Political quota-
/certificate price market" model (1999 Danish type) since it establishes
increased competition on the market for equipment, in this case “energy
automatons”.
     The "Political quota-/certificate price market" model ends up intro-
ducing a rather pointless price competition between energy automatons.
It is rather pointless because a competitive system, which, in theory, can
decrease costs in fossil fuel based systems by firing people in rationalisa-
tion processes, is introduced between automatons that cannot be ration-
alised, since there is virtually no one to fire once the automatons have
been installed on the production site.
     Thus, with the design of this "Political quota-/certificate price market"
price competition system, the regulators are in fact fighting yesterday’s
war.
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should the buyer be able to store a certificate?, etc. These are important
questions once it has been decided to implement a ”Political quota-
/certificate price market" system. But before this decision is taken, it is cru-
cial to analyse potential developments on this type of market. This was done
neither before the decision of proposing a “Political quota-/certificate price
market" system was taken, nor after.
The analysis in this publication leads to the following conclusion regarding
potential developments on a "Political quota-/certificate price market".
Prices on the future Danish “double market”, consisting of a fluctuating
“Green certificate-/ Quota market” combined with a fluctuating electricity
market, at present, the Nordpool market, will oscillate between 2 to 10
EUR/C/kWh. This makes it very difficult for small independent co-operative
investors to take part in the game, as they cannot borrow money for the ini-
tial wind turbine investment when income prospects are so insecure. Larger
institutional investors and power companies on the other hand would have
the possibility to continue investing due to their much stronger capital base.
Furthermore. the number of actors on the market will be limited to a few (2-
5) large groups of buyers, mainly associations of electricity distribution
companies. The access to the supply side will be limited to the large power
companies, along with an association of wind turbine owners and perhaps a
couple of newcomers (which will be very small seen in relation to the two
aforementioned). Thus, in reality, the market will consist of 2-5 buyers and
2-3 sellers.
Additionally, the 2-5 buyers (the distribution companies) own the power
utilities. What is thus obtained is a “market” with an oligopolistic structure
on both the sellers’ and the buyers’ sides, moreover with close ownership
links between one big producer, the power companies, and the buyer oli-
gopolies.
The technological structure, with 80% of the costs as sunk-/stranded costs
and short-term marginal costs that are close to zero, leads to a market that
can be manipulated rather easily. Wind turbine owners display an almost
vertical supply curve, meaning that they will continue selling electricity even
at a very low market price. So if the oligopolistic buyers group agrees to buy
less during a certain period, the prices of certificates will sink to the bottom
level of 1,34 EUR/C/kWh. And if the owners of independent/co-operative
wind turbines cannot survive this low price for a while, they will have to sell
their turbines at an absurdly low price. The same buyers group could also
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agree to build excess wind turbine capacity for a period of time with the help
of their power plants, a move that could also drag the “Certificate” price
down to ground level.
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How do the regulation models cope with natural resources varying from
location to location?
The costs of producing wind power vary from around 3 EUR/C/kWh on a
very good coastal site, in Ireland, for instance, to around 7 EUR/C/kWh on
an inland site in central Europe.
Conclusion 2. Type of competition on a Danish "Political quota-/certificate
price market"
a. Due to the cost structure of RE technologies, with more than 80% of total
costs as initial costs, the RE electricity supply curve is almost vertical on a
short-term basis. With a quota politically set at between 5-10% of the in-
stalled wind power capacity, the potential 20-30% yearly fluctuation of an-
nual wind resources will often completely annul the effects of the politically
set quota. Consequently, the Certificate price might oscillate between 1.34
EUR/C/kWh and 3,6 EUR/C/kWh, simply as a function of yearly fluctuating
wind resources.
b. Moreover this Certificate price oscillation is superimposed on a heavily
fluctuating ”base electricity price” on the Nordpool- and Leipzig spot markets
for electricity. It is thus very likely that the conjunction of these variations
will affect the prices of RE-electricity, which might then range between an
average price of.2,6 EUR/C/kWh one year and an average price of just above
6 EUR/C/kWh the next.
c. The combination of an almost vertical RE supply curve, a market with very
few suppliers, and ownership relations between large buyers and large power
company RE suppliers makes the market price very sensitive to manipulation
by the largest market agents.
d. Due to heavily fluctuating prices and the constant danger of price
manipulation, small, innovative and independent (from fossil fuel technolo-
gies) investors will no longer invest in wind turbines.
e. Due to fewer investors, competition between investors will decrease, and the
investor profit increase, with higher RE prices as the result.
f. Due to the pullout of small innovative investors, the local and regional
innovative process linked to RE will suffer.
g. Due to lack of economical and organisational incitements amongst the
remaining investors dominated by organisations linked to fossil fuel based
power systems, these investors will demand a relatively high investor profit,
when investing in RE technologies.
h. As a result of a-h, the political goodwill linked to wind turbines might
decrease, and politically determined quotas might become very small. Conse-
quently, it will be increasingly difficult to reach the CO2 goals.
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The EU policy regarding RE displays a consciousness of the necessity to not
only use very good coastal sites, but also good inland sites in Central
Europe.
The regulation situation consequently differs from the situation with fossil
fuel technologies, where the resource base, such as coal, oil or gas, has a
world market price, and can be bought everywhere in Europe at the same
price plus transportation costs.
So changing from fossil fuel technologies to RE technologies also spells a
shift from a situation with a uniform resource base to a situation with re-
sources varying from location to location. This change has important impli-
cations for the design of a feasible public regulation framework.
The main implication is that once resources of differing quality have to be
used, it is necessary to establish a public regulation system, which promotes
the efficient use of a resource in a given location. The regulation should en-
courage what we define here as “site efficiency”, by which we mean the cost
efficient use of a given site. At the same time, the regulation system should
foster a motivation to seek the best sites within the areas that, according to
political demands, should also be used for wind power production.
The comparison between the German, advanced "Political price-/amount
market" model and the Danish “Political quota-/certificate price market"
model leads our analysis to the following conclusions.
The main problem of the Danish "Political quota-/certificate price market"
system is that it is a “mono-price” model. We thereby mean that there will be
only one certificate price on the market for all wind turbines. Thus, a wind
turbine on a very good coastal site will get the same payment as a wind tur-
bine on an inland site. And if politicians find it necessary to not only exploit
the good coastal sites, they will have to guarantee a “Green Certificate”
payment, which provides a sufficient investment incitement for inland wind
turbine investors. The coastal wind turbine owners will benefit from this
system, and obtain very high profits per kWh. The painful consequences of
this type of “mono-price” system might be acceptable in a small country like
Denmark, with many coastal sites and relatively few inland sites. But it
would prove very expensive, if extended to the whole EU, where the very
good coastal sites of Ireland would get the same payment per kWh as the not
as good inland sites of central Europe.
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In our ‘calculation case-study’, we have a model Union with the following
distribution of wind sites: 15% in wind class 0, 30% in wind class 1, 25% in
wind class 2 and 30% in wind class 3. In a model Union with this type of
wind resource distribution, the additional profit (on top of production costs)
needed to impel investments will be 80%, which is simply due to the fact
that one has to pay inland prices for coastal sites.
The German, advanced "Political price-/amount market" model is character-
ised by its supporting a process of generating “site efficiency”, with a price
formula securing price differentiation between wind sites. A wind turbine on
a very good wind site will get 9.54 EUR/C/kWh during the first five years
and only 6,48 EUR/C/kWh for the rest of its production lifetime. A wind
turbine on an inland site will get the high price for a period of 20 years. Us-
ing this methodology of price differentiation, it becomes possible to avoid
paying the “inland price” for wind turbines placed on coastal sites. Thus, in
the above model Union, this public regulation strategy only requires a 28%
profit on top of production costs to stimulate investments.
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How do the two models deal with RE technological development and cost
reductions?
The "political quota-/certificate price market" model has to state RE quotas
several years ahead. In the Danish case, the Ministry of Environment and
Energy has mentioned 6-8 years as a necessary period in order to establish
sufficient investor security. So the quota today should be able to secure in-
vestments with today's RE productivity, which also means, that the price 6-8
years from now should be high enough to secure a pay back of the invest-
ment costs linked to today's RE productivity level. But within 6-8 years the
cost pr kWh of a given new RE technology can decrease considerably. In the
last 6-8 years the cost of wind power per kWh has decreased by at least 25%.
A governance "Political quota-/certificate price market" system is not able to
lower the price paid due to RE productivity improvements, as this would
destroy the economy of the firstcomer technology version.
Conclusion 3.  Ability to deal with a varying natural resource base
The Danish "Political quota-/certificate price market" model is a “mono-
price” model, which guarantees the same price for both certificates from
very good coastal sites and less favourable inland sites.
     The German, advanced "Political price-/amount market" system is a
“multi-price” model, which allows for price differentiation between very
good coastal sites, good coastal sites and inland wind sites with less wind
resources. The consequences of this difference are that:
a. The   advanced "Political price-/amount market" system can support a
much cheaper given wind power development than the "Political
quota-/certificate price market" system can.
b. The cost pressure on equipment producers will be higher in the   ad-
vanced "Political price-/amount market" system than in the "Political
quota-/certificate price market" system. This is because it prevents ex-
cess profits for wind turbines on coastal sites, profits that would make
the producers less cost sensitive. This characteristic is further en-
hanced by the fact that there is no quota regulation in the “advanced
feed in” system, which means that producers can sell more if they are
able to produce more cheaply in this system.
c. As the advanced "Political price-/amount market" system (2000 Ger-
man model) produces cheaper RE electricity than the "Political quota-
/certificate price market" system (1999 Danish model), the political
goodwill towards RE will be easier to sustain when using the   ad-
vanced "Political price-/amount market" regulation framework.
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As a consequence of the above arguments it also is very difficult in this gov-
ernance system to establish quotas resulting in very high prices for the first
year groups of a given RE technologies. If this is done, the society also will
have to pay this very high introduction price for the ensuing year groups,
even when they have much lower production costs.
Finally it should be emphasised that when combining Conclusion 3 with
Conclusion 2, where it is stated that small independent investors tend to
withdraw from the market in the "Political quota-/certificate price market"
model case, all the points in Conclusion 3 are then even more strongly but-
tressed.
Conclusion 4.
The "Political quota-/certificate price market" system is not able to lower
the price in parallel with cost reductions of RE year groups. This results
in a too high payment for RE electricity resulting in political resistance
against this technology.
     Furthermore, it hampers the possibility of establishing a market situa-
tion with very high prices at the initial stages of the RE technology in-
troduction at a market. This impedes the introduction of new RE tech-
nologies.
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Figure 16 illustrates the problems linked to the "Political quota-/certificate
price market" model.
Figure 16. The decomposition of competition in the "political quota-
/certificate price market" model.
Comments:
The investor market (box 2) is weakened due to the decrease in independent
investors.
The price market (box 4) is weakened due to an insufficient number of actors
and due to lack of independence between agents at the market.
The equipment market is weakened due to the quota system making it un-
economical to lower product prices for the producers as a group.
The regulation and flexibility market does not function, due to the present
monopoly situation.
The political acceptance of RE (box 3) is weakened due to decrease in the
number of neighbour and local investors.
Table 7 concentrates the above conclusion in  a comparison of the two gov-
ernance models.
(1) The “ Political quota- / certificate price market”
+ “electricity” market system. (Double pricemarket
system)
(5) Goal Efficiency with
regard to:
(a) Supply security
(b) Price
(c) Costs
(d) Environment
(e) Innovation
(f) System/”Turning point”
situation
(g) Democracy
(h) Competitiveness
(9) Equipment producers in this case renewable energy and energy
conservation equipment)
(7) Equipment payment rules (market)
(6) Infrastructure- / conversion- / flexibility market
Electricity
Demand
Consumer a
Consumer b
Consumer c
Consumer n
(3) Public regulation
Process / "market"
(A) Democratic Process
(B) Administrative
process
(8) Natural resource
base
(a) Fluctuating within days,
months, seasons, years.
(b) Regional variations in natural
resource base.
(10) Historical /
Technological situation
Conservation
and RE-supply
(4)
Price market
Electricity market
Certificate price
market
Firm 3Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm x
Political quota- / amount
(2) Investor
supply “market”
(O) Organisational
Infrastructure
(flexibility)
(f) Technical
Infrastructure
(flexibility)
(a) Local Banks
(a) Neighbour
local investors
(b) Large financial
investors
(c) Power utilities
(d) Distribution
companies
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"Political price-
amount market "
model
"Political quota-/certificate
price market" model
(a) Is it a market model? The price is political
and the amount is
decided upon a
market
The amount is political and
the price is partly decided
upon a market, partly politi-
cal set.
(b) Is it furthering com-
petition between equip-
ment producers?
Yes. The equipment
producers can ex-
pand sales and
profit by lowering
production costs
No. The equipment produc-
ers are facing quota. They
can mainly expand profit by
increasing sales prices.
(c) Can it price differ-
entiate between good
and bad wind sites?
Yes, as it is done in
the German model.
No. In this "mono price"
model, the same price is paid
independently of site re-
source base
(d) Can it price differ-
entiate price in time for
a given RE plant.
Yes, as it is done in
the German model.
No. The same price has to
be paid during the whole
lifetime of a RE plant.
(e) Can it lower the
price in parallel with RE
productivity improve-
ments?
Yes, as it is done in
the German model.
No. The quota has to be set
for a 6-8 years period, and
latecomer plants are paid
the same  as firstcomer
plants.
(f) Does it support
neighbour and local
investors?
Yes. The foresee-
able prices make it
possible to get loans
from the local
banks.
No. The fluctuating and
manipulated prices make it
too difficult to get loans
from the local banks.
(g) Does it put a cost
pressure upon equip-
ment producers?
Yes. Almost the
same cost pressure
is on investors at
good wind sites, as
investors at inland
wind sites.
In general, no. The mono
price system gives high
profits to owners of good
coastal sites. This weakens
the cost pressure upon plant
producers.
(h) Does it support in-
dependent investor
groups?
Due to the above (f),
yes.
Due to the above (f), no.
Table 7. A comparison of the "political price-/amount market" model with
the "political quota-/certificate price market" model.
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10.2 The discourse behind the design of the Danish RE-
electricity reform. (“second order institutions”)
RE technologies are still “newcomer” technologies entering a hostile envi-
ronment/market, where the established fossil fuel and uranium techno-
organisations will lose market shares if the RE technologies are successful.
When designing the governance framework, it is important to bear this de-
velopment condition in mind and ensure that organisations independent from
the fossil fuel- and uranium technologies be given an important role to play
in the RE development and implementation process.
The controversy over the introduction of a "Political quota-/certificate price
market" system in Denmark was characterised by the following:
a. The decision process was defective as there was no serious analysis of al-
ternatives, no risk analysis or contingency plans, a poor and biased informa-
tion research, a weak reappraisal of the decision, no open-ended debates with
opponents, no thorough discussion of the theoretical paradigm behind the
"Political quota-/certificate price market" model.
b. This defective decision process probably evolved during three phases:
Phase 1, during which the decision was apparently taken in a Ministerial
group called "the electricity reform group" before mid 1998 and away from
any open public debate.
Phase 2, from September 1998 to March 1999. A ‘public’ debate was then
going on, but the Ministry of Environment and Energy only argued for a
"Political quota-/certificate price market" model without showing any alter-
native possibilities. The Ministry did not seriously analyse and/or publicly
and systematically rejected the many objections raised against the model,
especially by Danish and German green organisations, and by Herman
Sheer, the German SPD spokesman for Energy questions.
During this period, the Ministry thus ‘heard but did not listen’ and just con-
tinued to sell its "Political quota-/certificate price market" model to the pub-
lic and the Parliamentarians. This strategy proved successful, and a solid
parliamentary majority backed the proposal in a March 1999 agreement. The
new electricity law including the "Political quota-/certificate price market"
model was approved by the Parliament in May 1999.
In Phase 3, during the Autumn of 1999, the implementation of the "Political
quota-/certificate price market" model was analysed and discussed. A con-
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sultancy firm, Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) made a report for the Min-
istry without seriously dealing with the problems linked to the general model
and the implementation process. These problems had been raised both orally
and on paper by several members of a broad Ministerial "advisory group",
which had been set up to follow and comment upon this work. During this
process, PWC collected information almost solely from the electricity com-
panies, generally ignoring the objections and problems put forward by the
association of wind turbine manufacturers, the association of wind turbine
owners, the Organisation for Renewable Energy (OVE) and the economists,
amongst others, from the Danish Economic Council.
The problem linked to the decision process can therefore be summarised by
emphasising that the Ministry acted ‘narrow-mindedly’, without being able-
or willing to establish an open decision process, where the pros and the cons
regarding the introduction of a "Political quota-/certificate price market"
were listed and evaluated in relation to alternative possibilities. The result of
this process was that the institutional framework decided upon was designed
in accordance with the demands and requirements of the fossil fuel based
part of the electricity sector. The suggestions and demands of the green or-
ganisations were generally ignored during this "first half" of negotiations.
This state of affairs will most certainly be challenged in the coming period,
when the theoretical reform meets the reality of a very limited Danish mar-
ket with only 2-3 sellers and 3-5 large buyers, thus creating almost ideal
conditions for a dysfunctional market.
What then could/should be done to avoid this type of flawed decision?
1. It is important to avoid decisions being taken in closed "insider circles",
as such groups will often be heavily influenced by the strongest actors
on the market, in this particular case the electricity companies.
2. A procedure should be established in the Ministry, whereby alternatives
are systematically described and the pros and cons analysed according to
an institutionalised methodological framework.
3. Consultancy firms employed by the Ministry should be economically
independent from the large established energy companies. If that is not
possible, grassroots organisations should be allocated resources for a
counter expertise, which can thus supply a well-documented second
opinion.
4. Generally speaking, answers from the Ministry to questions from the
public and Parliamentarians should display much more intellectual thor-
oughness than they did in this particular case. This could be secured
(amongst others) by allocating sufficient resources to the employees who
have to formulate the answers. Additionally, a procedure should be es-
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tablished, whereby Parliamentarians who are not satisfied with a Minis-
terial answer can obtain resources towards the elaboration of a "second
opinion". This might prove rather time- and resource consuming, but
probably less so than the administrative resources wasted on the making
of defective decisions that have to continually be changed and improved
ad hoc.
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11. A coming innovative and democratic
"Political price-/amount market" system.
This system is illustrated in figure is illustrated in Figure 17 and can in brief
be described as follows.
Fig 17. The proposed "Political price-/amount market" system.
The here proposed RE reforms has the following main components; the in-
troduction of:
A "political price-/amount market" system of a similar design as the new
German system.
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A governance system giving investment priority to neighbour-/local inves-
tors securing, that these groups always have the right to achieve ownership
shares.
A flexibility and conversion market, ensuring that local and regional tech-
nologies are included in the infrastructural regulation tasks.
A system of openness at early phases of the public regulation decision proc-
ess.
The result of including these components might probably be, as analysed in
this publication, that the many "different markets" will be vitalised:
The amount market because of a mechanism of produced amounts decided
by a market.
The equipment market while turnover can be increased by lowering prices.
The investor market because of the continuance and strengthening of local
and neighbour investor groups at the market.
The political market because of a system of openness, which makes it possi-
ble for many people to participate in the democratic process.
As a result of this vitalisation of the economical- as well as the "political
market" the RE innovation process will probably accelerate, and the
achievement of an array of energy policy goals will be within reach.
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12. Postscript in view of a European market
for RE
The EU Commission now seems much less intent on a "Political quota-
/certificate price market" model than they were a couple of years ago. In par-
allel the EU court decision, mentioned in Section 2.2, recognises that "Politi-
cal price-/amount market" models are not to be considered an illegal State
aid/public regulation mechanism. These developments, together with the fact
that the French Parliament has just approved a "Political price-/amount mar-
ket" model, not to mention the German legislation (2000) concerning the
advanced "Political price-/amount market" model, mean that the situation
seems much in 1999, when the Danish Parliament approved a legislation
introducing a "Political quota-/certificate price market" regulation frame-
work.
Thus, the arena is still open for discussions about the nature of a European
regulation framework. As emphasised in this publication, it is important to
establish a type of regulation which promotes natural resource “site effi-
ciency”, when dealing with the development of RE sources, where resource
intensity varies from location to location. It is also important to establish a
model, which furthers local participation in the development of RE sources.
The "Political quota-/certificate price market" model is a “price market”
model, with the market determining the prices, whereas the advanced "Po-
litical price-/amount market" model is an “equipment market” model, where
the market settles the produced quantity. As the equipment market is the im-
portant market to be considered when dealing with technologies which can
be regarded as energy automatons, an EU market for RE should particu-
larly ensure that the equipment market functions.
The above arguments then support the advanced "Political price-/amount
market" model as a model for Europe. It is especially significant that this
model is particularly well suited to a large area with very different natural
resources, as it promotes the generation of “site efficiency”. When consid-
ering the present national "Political price-/amount market" models, it is im-
portant to bear in mind that they do not just represent temporary "Political
price-/amount market" regulation, until it becomes technically possible to
establish a "Political quota-/certificate price market" model. Rather, they are
crucial stages on the way to an operationally common European regulation
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framework, based upon the principles in the   advanced "Political price-
/amount market" model.
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